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This thesis explores Derrida’s political thought, with special focus on his 
essay titled “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in which Derrida 
deals with the relation between Law and justice. By arguing that law is not equivalent 
to justice, Derrida points out that justice does not have its normative foundation. In 
this sense, justice could only exist as certain possible just actions which break the law 
but not abolish it completely or found a new one. In other words, since law could be 
unjust, only certain possible insurrection or revolution which breaks the unjust law as 
the normative construction of justice could bring justice back, in the form of 
instantaneous action of justice. Derrida’s viewpoint of justice and law potentially 
challenges the concept of normativity established by German Idealism like Kant and 
Hegel. For Hegel, justice could only be realizable if people’s actions are completely in 
conformity with the norm, the shared form of life of a community. Based upon the 
examination of Derrida’s viewpoint of law and justice, the second half of this thesis 
deepens Derrida’s theory of justice by reading it comparatively with some of 
Derrida’s other essays. My argument is that Derrida does not have faith in objective 
normative criterions of justice. In his view, the clear distinction between what is just 
and what is unjust is never very clear. Derrida insists that only by acknowledging this 
fact could people take certain just actions in reaction to the unjust. On the contrary, 
the idealistic imagination of the normative criterions of justice never succeeds in 
protecting its self-legislated criterions of justice from being eroded by the unexpected 
happening of the unjust.  
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       There are usually three ways that Derrida or deconstruction could be used, 
the linguistic/rhetoric approach adopted by Paul de Man and Jonathan Culler, the 
post-colonial approach taken by Pheng Cheah and Gayatri Spivak, and Derrida’s 
impact on religion or the philosophy of religion as shown by Hent de Vries, John 
Caputo, Gil Anidjar and Sarah Hammerschlag. These usages of Derrida or 
deconstruction all rely upon Derrida’s philosophical thinking, wholly or partially. This 
thesis aims at interrogating Derrida’s philosophical thinking, especially his thought 
concerning value and its normative construction. In this sense, “Force of Law: The 
Mystical Foundation of Authority”, which is included in the collection Acts of 
Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar, best illustrates the point that I want to make in terms 
of Derrida. Therefore, the first half of this thesis is dedicated to a textual interpretation 
of Derrida’s “Force of Law”. The purpose of this interpretation is to steer a path 
toward the question that I want to ask. As Derrida indicates in “Force of Law”, law is 
usually believed to be the synonym of justice, but is actually not. Law could be unjust, 
and therefore justice, since it could not be fully embodied by law, remains 
undecidable. The relation between law and justice that Derrida interrogates in “Force 
of Law” is in fact a question concerning justice and its normative construction, or 
broadly speaking, the relation between “value” and “norm”. This question could also 
be formulated in this way: all great values, like justice, for instance, are inseparable 
from certain normative settings, especially in a social or institutional sense, like law, 
for example. But Derrida aims at pointing out the hiatus, inconsistency or 
discontinuity between value and its normative construction. On the one hand, justice 
cannot merely float in the air as a pure concept or ideal; it can only be realized within 
certain type of institutional settings, or certain kind of law. On the other hand, law, as 
the normative construction of justice, always betrays justice.  
       In the second half of this thesis, I try to deepen the discussion of the question 
concerning the relation between law and justice in “Force of Law”, by linking it to 
	 v	
Derrida’s other pieces, like “Des Tours de Babel”, “Specters of Marx” and 
“Hospitality”, for instance. “Des Tours de Babel”, “Specters of Marx”, “Hospitality” 
and “Faith and Knowledge” are all concerned with the normative construction of 
cosmopolitanism and its limitation. In this sense, if the doctrine that law is equivalent 
to justice could be called Normative Objectivism, Derrida’s argument in “Force of 
Law” represents Normative Fictionalism: namely, law is not equivalent to justice, but 
law, as the normative construction of Lebenswelt, is indispensable for human life and 
there is no way for people to live without it. This idea also represents French 
Post-Structuralism broadly, including also Michael Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Roland 
Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler and Slavoj Zizek. All of them, as well as 
Derrida, focus upon the normative/discursive/institutional construction of subjectivity. 
In other words, we are all living in a kind of social/moral code which is not only 
normative but also constructs our lives via people’s action. In this sense, 
deconstruction is another type of the “trans-valuation of all values”: on the one hand, 
it deconstructs all the ‘deconstructable’, namely, all the normative/institutional 
settings of value which has its own limitation, and the limitation of them has to be 
disclosed; on the other hand, it also points out that no value, like justice or democracy, 
could remain as unchangeable, a-historical or time-transcending. It is always possible 
for them to be contaminated or destroyed by the unjust, the non-democratic, or the 
‘radical evil’ in a Kantian sense. Therefore, by pointing out the conflict, the hiatus, the 
inconsistency between values and their normative constructions, like between justice 
and law, between cosmopolitanism and “hospitality”, “neo-liberalism” or Christian 
messianism, Derrida also opens the dialogue between them. Hence, the purpose of 
deconstruction is not to seek for another type of ‘transcendent justice’ beyond the 
imperfect body of justice, or beyond its normative construction. The purpose of 
deconstruction is only to disclose the limitation of law or cosmopolitanism, as well as 
the possibility to move between the “value” and “norm”, justice and the unjust, or 






Justice and the Unjust: Law, Violence and Transcendent Justice 
 
1.1. Derrida on Justice and the Unjust Law 
In Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, Derrida poses a 
question concerning the relation between justice and normativity, or justice and law. It 
is a commonsense that what is just, or a just action has also to be lawful. Namely, only 
law can represent justice. In this sense, it is impossible to call an action just, if it is not 
lawful, though it could be ‘just’ in certain sense, like killing a vicious man by oneself, 
for instance. This kind of practice is completely prohibited in a legalized and 
normalized society, where law and justice are the synonym of each other. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that law is totally coterminous with justice, or it is 
never possible that law itself could be unjust. In fact, law could be unjust, and this is 
the reason why in Derrida’s view, the commonsense that law is the equivalence of 
justice has to be challenged and the unjust part of law has to be revealed. What is 
unjust could be legalized by law, or could even be publicly accepted as the lawful. 
This often happens when the prejudice against certain social minorities becomes 
commonly acknowledged or legalized. In this sense, law is essentially intermingled 
with language, ethnicity and nationality. As Derrida indicates:  
As is well known, in many countries, in the past and in the present, one of the 
founding violence of the law or of the imposition of state law has consisted in 
imposing a language on national or ethnic minorities regrouped by the state. 
This was the case in France on at least two occasions, first when the 
Villers-Cotteret decree consolidated the unity of the monarchic state by 
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imposing French as the juridico-administrative language and by forbidding 
Latin, the language of law or of the Church. The decree allowed all the 
inhabitants of the kingdom to be represented in a common language, by a 
lawyer-interpreter, without the imposition of the particular language that 
French still was. It is true that Latin was already carrying a violence. The 
passage from Latin to French was only the passage from one violence to 
another. The second major moment of imposition was that of the French 
Revolution, when linguistic unification sometimes took the most repressive 
pedagogical turns, or in any case the most authoritarian ones. I am not going 
to engage in the history of these examples. One should also find others in the 
United States, yesterday and today; the linguistic problem is still acute there 
and will be for a long time, precisely in such a place where questions of 
politics education, and law are inseparable (2002, 249).  
If Latin features the medieval cosmopolitan world linguistically, like what 
Benedict Anderson indicates in The Imagined Communities, the nationalization 
movement initiated by French Revolution replaces the Christian cosmopolitanism 
with modern nationalism. Namely, a people with a historically shared territory, a 
common language, a common ethnical identity, a shared religion and shared historical 
memory of great events concerning the foundation of their nation is naturalized as if 
people are culturally-genetically so. This naturalization of people results in the 
exclusion of minorities, identifying only people with the shared identity as ‘human’, 
whereas the excluded minorities are non-human:  
        In the space in which I am situating these remarks or reconstituting this 
discourse one would not speak of injustice or violence toward an animal, 
even less toward a vegetable or a stone. An animal can be made to suffer, 
but one would never say, in a sense said to be proper, that it is a wronged 
subject, the victim of a crime, of a murder, of a rape or a theft, of a 
perjury--- and this is true a fortiori, one thinks, for what one calls vegetable 
or mineral or intermediate species like the sponge. There have been, there 
are still, many “subjects” among humankind who are not recognized as 
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subjects and who receive this animal treatment. What one confusedly 
calls “animal,” the living thing as living and nothing more, is not a subject 
of the law or of right. The opposition between just and unjust has no 
meaning as far as it is concerned. Whether it is a matter of trials of animals 
(there have been some) or lawsuits against those who inflict certain kinds of 
suffering on animals (legislation in certain western countries provides for 
this and speaks not only of the “right of man” but also of the rights of the 
animal in general), these are archaisms or still marginal and rare phenomena 
not constitutive of our culture. In our culture, carnivorous sacrifice is 
fundamental, dominant, regulated by the highest industrial technology, as 
is biological experimentation on animals—so vital to our modernity 
(246-247). The example closest to us would be found in the area of laws 
[lois] on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of 
cannons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, 
problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine conception, bio- 
engineering, medical experimentation, the “social treatment” of AIDS, 
the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, homelessness, and so on, without 
forgetting, of course, the treatment of what one calls animal life, the 
immerse question of so-called animality (258).  
If nationality or ethnicity is legalized and law is conditioned historically, 
geographically and politically by nationality and ethnicity, as Derrida indicates, the 
violence against minorities could also be directly or indirectly legitimized by law and 
therefore is not deemed as an unjust action. In other words, if law is ethnically 
conditioned, so does justice. In this sense, Derrida attempts a deconstructive 
interrogation of law, namely, to reveal that the equivalence between justice and law is 
not as natural as what people usually think, or violence against minorities could be 
legitimized. In other words, as Derrida argues, justice is not law, and deconstruction is 
to pursue justice beyond law (244). In this sense, deconstruction does not refer to 
irresponsibility, but a way to increase responsibility, since it is to question the 
legitimacy and dogmatism of law itself. The responsibility which results from 
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deconstruction is also not responsibility in its commonsense: it is responsibility with 
self-reflection upon its cultural/ ethnical/ religious preconditions. This self-reflection 
exposes what is paradoxical to ourselves: namely, when people claim that they are 
responsible for others, they are not equally responsible for every single other. On the 
contrary, they are always irresponsible for certain people when they are claiming their 
responsibility for whom they think they should be responsible for. (248-249). Thus, 
the responsibility given by deconstruction is the responsibility for each individual as 
an individual, or the responsibility for the particularity of each individual, rather than 
responsibility for a certain type of people, instead of another1 (248).  
       In “Force of Law”, Derrida does not provide an example to illustrate how, in 
his view, law could be unjust. In this sense, an excellent example which illuminates 
Derrida’s theory of law is in Pheng Cheah’s Inhuman Condition: On Cosmopolitanism 
and Human Rights, in which he applies Derrida’s critique of law in a case concerning 
global capitalism, transnational recruitment of labor and immigration law in 
South-Eastern Asia. The story begins with a historical fact that the fast growth of 
capitalism in the post-cold-war era forces non-western underdeveloped countries into 
a global order of neo-liberalism. In order to promote economic growth, non-western 
underdeveloped countries have to accept western capital investment. It starts with 
western industries transferring their manual-labor based production to non-western 
areas, like South-Eastern Asia, for instance, to profit themselves by exploiting local 
cheap labor. This transnational specialization of labor does help some non-western 
areas into developed countries, like Singapore, for instance. Based upon its quick 
economic growth, the Singaporean government expects itself to be a 
technologically-advanced economy. Therefore, its policy encourages experts and 
																																								 																				 	
1 “But the address always turns out to be singular. An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, 
as law, seems always to suppose the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative. How to 
reconcile the act of justice that must always concern singularity, individuals, groups, irreplaceable 
existences, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value, or the imperative 
of justice that necessarily have a general form, even if this generality prescribes a singular application 
in each case”? See Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority.” In Acts of 
Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar. London: Routledge, 2002, 245; “one must know that this justice always 
addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other, despite or even because it pretends to 
universality.” Ibid., 248.  
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skilled labors to immigrate to and work in Singapore, but discourages low-salary job 
holders into it2 (2006, 199). This policy of immigration contradicts the fact that, for 
other underdeveloped countries in South-Eastern or Southern Asia, to export 
low-salary labor to Singapore is the only way through which they are able to profit 
themselves from the economic advantage of Singapore3 (193). On the other hand, 
though low salary job holders are discouraged in Singapore, they are also 
indispensable for Singapore society (201-202), as a “necessary but undesirable 
presence” (210). Thus, the conflict happens between Singapore government’s 
expectation to minimalize the number of low-salary job holders in its country, and its 
neighbor countries’ will to maximize their exportation of low-salary labor to 
Singapore. But what causes this conflict is the classification and standardization of 
human caused by capitalism: the market-value of people is quantitatively measurable 
and collectively manageable: the administration of the marketized human resource is 
what Foucault calls the bio-politics. In a Foucauldian view, “instead of functioning 
repressively, the central task of bio-power is the administration of human life as a 
resource that can be attached to the apparatus of production or adjusted to broader 
economic processes” (199-200). Namely, the market-value of some people is lower 
than the value of others. Or as Derrida indicates, “there have been, there are still, 
many “subjects” among humankind who are not recognized as subjects and who 
receive this animal treatment”. When this marketization of human value is reinforced 
by law, it becomes what Derrida means, namely, law is not equivalent to justice.  
       The immigration law that is exercised by Singapore government is not 
exactly like what in Derrida’s view, “in many countries, in the past and in the present, 
																																								 																				 	
2 “As part of the reproductive sphere, these migrant workers are crucial to the sustaining of social and 
civil life. But they are not recognized as “foreign talent.” They are merely “foreign workers” to be used 
and discarded rather than integrated into the social fabric of the city-state. Indeed, these two poles of 
cosmopolitan labor have distinctively different legal statuses. Members of the higher tier hold 
“employment passes” and enjoy liberal benefits and conditions of employment designed to induce them 
to take up permanent residence and even citizenship, whereas those in the lower tier merely hold 
temporary “work permits” that must be renewed every two years for a maximum stay of eight years 
and are subject to stringent legal restrictions” Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human 
Rights. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006, 199.  
3 “Low-growth countries, however, face a profoundly troubling dilemma. On the one hand, they hope 
to achieve full employment for their citizens. On the other hand, this and the nation’s economic 
development can occur only if the state actively engages in exporting its workers.” Ibid., 193.  
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one of the founding violence of the law or of the imposition of state law has consisted 
in imposing a language on national or ethnic minorities regrouped by the state” (249). 
Instead of imposing a Singaporean national identity upon the immigrants, the 
Singapore government protects its own citizens who are mostly experts and skilled 
workers and opposes low-salary immigrants. In Singapore, the low-salary job holders, 
or the Foreign Domestic Workers (FDW), are most likely women immigrants who are 
only able to be household maids, assisting local Singapore families by doing their 
daily housework. But, no matter how hostile is Singapore to the immigrants as maids, 
they are an indispensable part in the local division of labor4. The result is that, the 
FDWs are easily abused by native citizens and are not legally protected. In other 
words, just like what Derrida means, the abusing of FDWs in Singapore is legally 
acceptable in certain sense. There are two reasons for this. First, since the FDWs are 
unskilled, low-salary workers, the Singapore government is unwilling to protect them 
as how they protect their legal citizens and highly-skilled immigrants. The private 
contract between FDWs and each family as their employer cannot protect them from 
brutalization5. Moreover, the Singapore government works very hard to minimalize 
																																								 																				 	
4As Pheng Cheah indicates, “Singaporean women can join the workforce only if the burden of 
reproductive labor is transferred elsewhere; hence, in order to attach educated middle-class women to 
the professions and high-value service industries, migrant women have to be tethered to the 
Singaporean home qua machine for the reproduction of society and human capital so that the forces of 
their bodies can be extracted as reproductive labor” Ibid., 202. Also, as Pheng Cheah indicates (quoting 
Noeleen Heyzer and Vivienne Wee), “in the disappearance of unpaid female labour in the home, the 
alternative of paying for available and affordable migrant female labour remains the economic 
responsibility of the family, especially that of the working woman. It is in this sense that in the 
receiving countries, development processes are being subsided by a genderised international class 
structure--- by the labour subsidy of female migrant workers and by the income subsidy (and therefore 
also a labour subsidy) of middle class women. The displacement of the costs and burdens of social 
reproduction from the state to migrant women from poorer countries means that economic success 
within the new international division of labor generates and is sustained by an international division of 
domestic labor.” Ibid., 207.  
5	 “Unlike foreign construction workers, domestic workers are not governed by the Employment Act. 
The Singaporean government has repeatedly insisted that the employment of domestic labor involves a 
private contract between worker and employer and that the conditions of service and wages should be 
determined by the free market rather than by labor legislation. The excuses given for this policy are the 
sacrosanct privacy of the home and the impracticality of enforcement. The state maintains that the 
household cannot and should not be regulated like a workplace.” Ibid., 215-220. As Pheng Cheah 
indicates, this assumption is wrong in two ways: first, the contract between the FDWs and their 
employers is not merely based upon their ‘free will’. The FDWs are already the product of biopolitics. 
Namely, in a marketized society, they are merely used as means for other people’s ends, rather than to 
be respected as ends. Second, the Singapore government already intervenes people’s household life, 
since it encourages domestic Singaporean women to go to work. This is also the reason why the maids 
are needed to take care of the housework of the native citizens. Ibid., 220-221.  
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the number of FDWs in its country. It imposes an extra levy upon each family who 
hire FDWs as maids. This practice indirectly forces those families who employ FDWs 
to reduce their payment to them (209-210): as Joanna Elias, a thirty-seven-year-old 
Filipina FDW indicates, “the employer wants them to work for every cent they pay 
them” (215), since “the rising costs of employing an FDW lead employers to expect 
to get more out of their maids” (209-210). Meanwhile, the Singapore government has 
a social security and anti-criminal concern, expecting the behaviors of the FDWs in 
Singapore to be strictly and collectively administrated, and the families as the 
employers of them are expected to monitor and discipline them6 (210). For this, each 
family who want to hire FDW as their maids are required to submit S$5,000 as 
security bond (210). Namely, if the FDWs violate the restrictions that the Singapore 
government imposes upon them, the security bond payed by their employers will be 
forfeited7 (210). In this sense, the FDWs in Singapore are completely depoliticized, 
or are totally deprived of their potentials to be politically actively. The Singaporean 
state plays the role as what Hannah Arendt calls the modern public housekeeper 
(28-29). It promotes economic efficiency by prohibiting any extra-production 
activities, silencing any possible discontents. Thus, everyone is routinized for 
capitalistic production, just like slaves in ancient Greek household life, but in a much 
larger house, a house as the whole society8.  
																																								 																				 	
6 “The employer has a responsibility to mitigate the social problems they cause. Indeed, it is almost a 
public duty of the employer to control the behavior and movement of her foreign maid. From the start, 
therefore the FDW is viewed as a minor or delinquent, someone without a full moral personality who 
needs to be trained, corrected, and policed so that she will not err.” Ibid., 210-211.  
7 “An FDW is granted a work permit subject to various conditions. The most repressive of these 
conditions are the prohibition of marriage to a Singapore citizen or permanent resident during her stay 
and the prohibition of pregnancy. The FDW is also required to submit to a medical examination for 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases once every six months, and is repatriated immediately if 
the test results are positive. Since the bond is forfeited if any of these conditions are violated, the 
mechanism transfers the monitoring of workers to the site of the household, where it can be performed 
most effectively and zealously by employers to prevent the possibility of any ‘illegitimate’ activities 
even before the FDW enters into public space.” Ibid., 210.  
8 “In our understanding, the dividing line is entirely blurred, because we see the body of peoples and 
political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a 
gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping. The scientific thought that corresponds to this 
development is no longer political science but ‘national economy’ or ‘social economy’, all of which 
indicate a kind of ‘collective housekeeping’; the collective of families economically organized into the 
facsimile of one super-human family is what we call ‘society,’ and its political form of organization is 
called ‘nation.’” The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1998, 28-29.  
	 8	
       The FDW immigrants are also not able to be legally protected by their 
motherlands, the labor-exporting countries, like Philippine, for instance. Singapore as 
the labor-importing country is unwilling to protect them, for the sake of maximizing 
their own interests, so does the labor-exporting country. People in Philippine are only 
legally permitted to work oversea on condition that they send a mandatory amount of 
money out of their monthly income back to their families via a designated bank, and 
the whole process is monitored by local government 9  (224). Moreover, for 
maximizing the total incomes gained from the FDWs, the local government is hesitant 
to make the request to Singapore government to protect the human right of their 
oversea immigrants, since this may make Singapore government more reluctant to 
import cheap labor from them10 (240). In one word, the human right of the FDWs are 
sacrificed for the maximization of national interests of both the labor-importing 
country, like Singapore, and the labor-exporting country, like Philippine11 (241). This 
sacrifice of FDWs for national interests exemplifies what Derrida means by saying 
that law is always calculable, but justice is incalculable. The mechanism of 
calculation is that, like what Pheng Cheah describes, law is always used by certain 
agent to maximize its own interests at the cost of the sacrifice of others. In other 
words, both the labor-importing country and the labor-exporting country are 
‘calculating’ the profits that they can get from exporting or importing the FDWs, but 
																																								 																				 	
9 “Sending remittances back home is a necessary condition of overseas employment under Philippine 
law. Under Article 23 of the Labor Code and Executive Order 857, every contract worker has to remit a 
portion of earnings to her beneficiary in the Philippines through the Philippine banking system. All 
officially processed labor contracts for domestic workers include a provision mandating that they remit 
50 percent of their based salary. The limited-validity passports of OCWs can be renewed only if proof 
is provided that the remittance requirement has been complied with; noncompliance will cause an 
individual to be removed from the list of workers eligible for overseas employment. The Overseas 
Workers Investment (OWI) Fund Act passed under the Aquino regime formalized the policy of 
improving economic growth by ‘tapping the unofficial and informal remittances of OCWs.” Cheah, 
Inhuman Conditions, 224.  
10 A labor officer in the Sri Lankan High Commission observed that mentioning human rights would 
not be of much help: “You can fight for human rights in your own country but not in a foreign country. 
In the media here, no one speaks of human rights. If a country tries to enforce human rights 
requirements, demand for domestic labor from that country will drop. We have no hand in this. It is 
beyond our limits. It is a governmental matter. We will lose our market share if we make too many 
demands.” Ibid., 240.  
11	 “The protection of migrant workers’ rights is in a tense relationship to the imperatives of profit 
making and economic development that is neither one of simple opposition nor one of continuity. The 
economic development of the labor-sending country is premised on sacrificing its workers’ human 
rights. Any attempt to protect such rights must always be balanced against the need to maintain or 
increase the market share in FDWs.” Ibid., 241.  
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neither of them wants to do justice to these immigrants. In this sense, justice is 
suspended when law is applied. Or as Derrida says, “there have been, there are still, 
many ‘subjects’ among humankind who are not recognized as subjects and who 
receive this animal treatment” (246). Similar to Derrida, Hannah Arendt, in The 
Human Condition, argues that in ancient Greek polity, only the ‘bios’, the human 
beings as what Aristotle means the ‘political animal’, are free citizens, whereas the 
‘zoe’, the slaves, are animal-like human, who, exactly like the FDWs in modern 
Singapore, only do housework and are administrated by command and violence12. 
Pheng Cheah also uses ‘bios’ to describe the difference between Singapore citizens 
and the FDWs. As he says, “although the Ministry of Manpower acknowledges the 
important economic and social contributions of FDWs to Singaporean society, these 
are not enough to warrant their full integration into the Singaporean bios” (207).  But 
the difference between Pheng Cheah and Arendt is that, Cheah has a more 
complicated understanding of capitalism in relation to humanity, if compared with 
Hannah Arendt’s critique of the depoliticizing effect of capitalism in modern world in 
The Human Condition. In fact, Pheng Cheah does not completely denigrate the 
significance of the role that capitalism plays in human society. What he means is that 
capitalism, when giving freedom and humanity to some people, are depriving the 
freedom and humanity of the others 13  (265). By adopting a quasi-Marxism 
perspective, Cheah contends that the material condition is indispensable for the 
																																								 																				 	
12 “Aristotle distinguished three ways of life (bioi) which men might choose in freedom, that is, in full 
independence of the necessities of life and the relationships they originated. This prerequisite of 
freedom ruled out all ways of life chiefly devoted to keeping one’s self alive--- not only labor, which 
was the way of life of the salve, who was coerced by the necessity to stay alive and by the rule of his 
master, but also the working life of the free craftsman and the acquisitive life of the merchant. In short, 
it excluded everybody who involuntarily or voluntarily, for his whole life or temporarily, had lost the 
free disposition of his movements and activities. Arendt, The Human Condition, 12. The chief 
difference between the Aristotelian and the later medieval use of the term is that the bios politikos, 
denoted explicitly only the realm of human affairs, stressing the action, praxis, needed to establish and 
sustain it. Neither labor nor work was considered to possess sufficient dignity to constitute a bios at all, 
an autonomous and authentically human way of life; since they served and produced what was 
necessary and useful, they could not be free, independent of human needs and wants.” Ibid., 13.  
13 “Instead of lamenting the horrendous ways in which human labor is commodified and the humane 
institution of the family is deformed and perverted by global capitalism, we should examine how the 
technologies sustaining global capitalism both enable and disenable the actualization of humanity. My 
insistence on the generative character of the technologies sustaining capitalist globalization should not 
be mistaken for the neoliberal argument that the global spread of the market system is to be welcomed 
despite its patently negative consequences because, through the dissemination of the formal rule of law 
and human rights discourses, it leads to the actualization of humanity.” Ibid., 265.  
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realization of humanity (265). In other words, men cannot live without economic life. 
But it is economy that creates a kind of ‘criteriology’ of mankind, which makes 
certain people more valuable than the others, and this criteriology, just as Derrida 
indicates, is reinforced by law14 (247).   
For Derrida, to contend that law is not equivalent to justice, or sometimes 
what is legal is also unjust, does not simply suggest that law could be merely 
abolished occasionally for the sake of justice. This is what Derrida calls “Aporia”, or 
a dilemma but no way out of it. Since what is just has to be legal, or authorized or 
legitimized by law, and the legality of law is legitimized by the authority of the 
legislator (here the authority of the legislator also suggests a whole system of state 
apparatus in a Marxian or Foucauldian sense to enforce the law, especially police, 
which Derrida talks about later), an unjust law could not be simply invalidated by an 
individual judge who discerns this injustice. Thus the dilemma is that, a judge could 
only do what the law authorizes him to do, and the judge has to obey the law even if 
that law itself is unjust. In this case, what is lawful is actually unjust, and justice is not 
coterminous with law. This is also the reason why Derrida calls justice the 
“undecidable”:  
this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the 
order of the calculable and the rule, must [doit] nonetheless—it is of duty 
[devoir] that one must speak—deliver itself over to the impossible decision 
while taking account of law and rules. A decision that would not go through 
the test and ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision; it would 
only be the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a 
calculable process. It might perhaps be legal; it would not be just. But in the 
moment of suspense of the undecidable, it is not just either, for only a 
decision is just. In order to maintain the proposition “only a decision is just”, 
																																								 																				 	
14 “From this very first step, one can already glimpse a first consequence: by deconstructing the 
partitions that institute the human subject (preferably and paradigmatically the adult male, rather than 
the woman, child, or animal) at the measure of the just and the unjust, one does not necessarily lead 
toward injustice, nor to the effacement of an opposition between just and unjust but, in the name of a 
demand more insatiable than justice, leads perhaps to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus of limits 
within which a history and a culture have been able to confine their criteriology.” Derrida, “Force of 
Law”, 247.  
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one need not refer decision to the structure of a subject or to the propositional 
form of a judgment. In a way, and at the risk of shocking, one could even say 
that a subject can never decide anything [un sujet ne peut jamais rien decider]: 
a subject is even that to which a decision cannot come or happen [arriver] 
otherwise than as a marginal accident that does not affect the essential identity 
and the substantial presence-to-self that make a subject what it is—if the 
choice of the word subject is not arbitrary, at least, and if one trusts in what is 
in fact always required, in our culture, of a subject (252).  
Here the “undecidable” refers to justice. The word “decision” in this paragraph has 
three meanings: first, it is merely a legal decision. It is legal but is not just, since it is 
merely the application of law but not to challenge the unjust part of law. Second, in 
contrast to this merely legal but not just decision, Derrida calls the truly just decision 
a “free decision”. This kind of truly just decision, as Derrida indicates, is not actually 
realizable, since no one can make a juridical decision without the restriction of law. 
The third meaning of decision is a kind of decision that crosses between these two 
kinds of decisions: it refers to a situation in which the judge is aware of the injustice 
of law, and wants to but cannot make a truly just decision without the restriction of 
the unjust law. This is what the phrase “only a decision is just” means: a truly just 
decision has to be made but cannot be made. Hence what Derrida means is that people 
have to fight against the unjust law for the sake of realizing justice, but also that this 
practice cannot be fully carried out without frustration, or without being contaminated 
by the unjust law. Finally, a compromise is necessary between justice and law. As 
Derrida argues: 
       Once the test and ordeal of the undecidable has passed (if that is possible, 
but this possibility is not pure, it is never like another possibility: the memory 
of the undecidability must keep a living trace that forever marks a decision as 
such), the decision has again followed a rule, a given, invented or reinvented, 
and reaffirmed rule: it is no longer presently just, fully just. At no moment, it 
seems can a decision be said to be presently and fully just: either it has not 
yet been made according to a rule, and nothing allows one to call it just, 
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or it has already followed a rule—whether given, received, confirmed, 
preserved or reinvented—which, in its turn, nothing guarantees absolutely; 
and, moreover, if it were guaranteed, the decision would have turn back into 
calculation and one could not call it just. (253).  
       The relation between law and justice discussed by Derrida in this essay raises 
inevitably another problem: If Derrida considers law as not the legal or institutional 
embodiment of justice, nor appeal so a conservative type of ‘justice beyond law’, as 
has been done by Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, the resistance against the unjust 
law -as well as the possibility of this kind of resistance becomes a question that 
Derrida has to answer. In fact, Derrida does not have faith in a total revolution which 
could completely rescind the unjust law, or totally transform a society with unjust 
conventions, nor does Derrida believe in any type of ‘messianism’, in either the 
religious or the political sense, which preaches a supposedly better future to people. 
But this does not imply that Derrida has completely no belief in terms of the 
possibility to resist. The question concerning the possibility of resistance makes itself 
heard in the third ‘aporia’ in Force of Law, which is titled “the urgency that obstructs 
the horizon of knowledge”.  
First, in Derrida’s view, the possibility to resist the unjust law originates in 
the linguistic nature of law. By drawing reference from Austin’s philosophy of 
language, he argues that law is a combination of the two types of speech acts in the 
author’s How to Do Things With Words: the performative and the constative speech 
act. The performative refers to a speech act through which a speaker is performing an 
action. The constative refers to no particular action, but at most describes one. It is 
merely a statement of fact. The performative speech is regulated by certain rules: in 
particular, the performative speech should be based upon certain conventions or laws, 
and the speaker should have the authority to perform the action. In this sense, the 
constative and the performative together comprise the application of law in a specific 
case. The application of law is not merely the statement of facts, which is the 
constative part of it, but also reveals an action which is going to be performed, like 
punishment, compensation, compromise and apology. For instance, if the code writes 
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that murder incurs death penalty, in a case of murder, it is both the statement of a fact 
and an action which is going to be performed for the sake of this fact. Meanwhile, 
according to Austin’s linguistic theory, the action that is going to be performed is 
based upon certain convention and authority. In the case of a judicial judgment of a 
murder, law itself is the convention upon which the judgment is based.  
Based upon this, what Derrida attempts to argue is that, although the 
performative speech relies upon certain conventions and authority, it is not completely 
predetermined by them. In other words, an unjust law does not completely prevent 
people from performing a just action. This is also the first ‘aporia’ (The Epokhe of the 
Rule) that Derrida lists in “Force of Law”. Justice, he writes, is always associated 
with freedom. In other words, an action cannot be defined as a just action if the agent 
does not have the freedom to act according to his or her own will. But, on the other 
hand, an action which merely comes out of one’s free will can also not be recognized 
as a just action, since justice always suggests compliance with certain rules.15 In this 
sense, as Derrida indicates, a judge has to make a decision as if the decision both 
comes out of his own will and, at the same time he must be in compliance with the 
rule, or as if the rule is not imposed upon the judge but, in the Kantian lexicon, 
legislated by the judge himself16. This is also what Austin’s linguistic theory means in 
																																								 																				 	
15 “our most common axiom is that to be just or unjust, to exercise justice or to transgress it I must be 
free and responsible for my action, my behavior, my thought, my decision. One will not say of a being 
without freedom, or at least of one who is not free in a given act, that its decision is just or unjust. But 
this freedom or this decision of the just, if it is to be and to be said such, to be recognized as such, must 
follow a law [loi] or a prescription, a rule. In this sense, in its very autonomy, in its freedom to follow 
or to give itself the law [loi], it has to be capable of being of the calculable or programmable order, for 
example, as an act of fairness. But if the act simply consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program 
or effecting a calculation, one will perhaps say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by 
metaphor, that it is just, but one would be wrong to say that the decision was just, simply because there 
was, in this case, no decision.” Ibid., 251.  
16 “to be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not only follow a rule of law or a general law 
but must also assume it, approve it, confirm is value, by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if, at the 
limit, the law did not exist previously--- as if the judge himself invented it in each case. Each exercise 
of justice as law can be just only if it is a ‘fresh judgment’. This new freshness, the initiality of this 
inaugural judgment can very well--- better yet, must very well--- conform to a preexisting law. But the 
reinstituting, re-inventive and freely deciding interpretation of the responsible judge requires that his 
‘justice’ not consist only in conformity, in the conservative and reproductive activity of judgment. In 
short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment, if there is one, be both 
regulated and without regulation, it must preserve the law and also destroy or suspend it enough to 
have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, reinvent it at least in the reaffirmation and the new and free 
confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely 
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terms of the performative speech act. But, for Derrida, the decision made by a judge is 
not always in compliance with the rules. In other words, there is still the possibility 
and space for improvisation, even though the improvisation cannot completely 
overthrow the law. As Derrida indicates: 
       If one were to trust in a massive and decisive distinction between 
performative and constative—a problem I cannot get involved here--- one 
would have to attribute this irreducibility of precipitate urgency, this 
inherent irreducibility of thoughtlessness and unconsciousness, however 
intelligent it may be, to the performative structure of “speech acts” and 
acts in general as acts of justice or of law, whether they be performatives 
that institute something or derived performatives supposing anterior 
conventions. And it is true that any current performative supposes, in order to 
be effective, an anterior convention. A constative can be juste, in the sense of 
justesse, never in the sense of justice. But as a performative cannot be just, 
in the sense of justice, except by grounding itself in on conventions and so 
on other performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some 
irruptive violence. It no longer responds to the demands of theoretical 
rationality. And it never did, it was never able to; of this one has an apriori 
and structural certainty. Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least 
implicitly, on a performative structure, the dimension of justesse or truth of 
theoretico-constative utterances (in all domains, particularly in the domain of 
the theory of law) always thus presupposes the dimension of justice of the 
performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which 
never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some quality of violence 
(256).  
Here the irruptive violence and dissymmetry suggest the inconsistency between law 
and the action that people are going to perform based upon law. For example, an 
immigration law which refutes the legal status of certain immigrants does not mean 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 													 	
unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely. (At least, if 
the rule does guarantee it in a secure fashion, then the judge is a calculating machine.) Ibid., 251-252.  
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that there is no just action that could be done for these immigrants. It is possible that a 
just action could draw reference from other legal resources to help them, or a lawyer 
or a judge could improvise based upon existing laws to help the immigrants as much 
as possible.  
       Second, the possibility of resistance is also concerned with the problem of 
temporality, or, in other words, the time when the resistance is going to begin. Since 
the unjust law cannot be abolished or an unjust society could not be transformed 
immediately, justice for Derrida is always “to come”. Namely, it is always a 
future-tensed action. However, this “to come of justice” has to be differentiated from 
two commonly accepted notions of justice in future: first of all, the coming of justice 
does not indicate that it could be realized deliberatively or via people’s rational 
deliberation or speculation. Derrida denigrates the social-evolutionary view that the 
well-being of human society could be scientifically improved based upon the 
knowledge that people have had already. Instead of the historical teleology which 
preaches an evolution toward an ideal type of human society, Derrida insists that 
justice comes as “a finite moment of urgency” and “as quickly as possible”. As he 
argues: 
Yet, justice, however, unpresentable it remains, does not wait. It is that which 
must not wait. To be direct, simply and brief, let us say this: a just decision is 
always required immediately, right away, as quickly as possible. It cannot 
provide itself with the infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of 
conditions, rules, or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it. And even if 
it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time 
and all the necessary knowledge about the matter, well then, the moment of 
decision as such, what must be just must [il faut] always remains a finite 
moment of urgency and precipitation; it must not be the consequence or the 
effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this 
deliberation, since the decision always marks the interruption of the 
juridico-, ethico-, or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that 
must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard, This 
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is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and 
defy dialectics. It is a madness; a madness because such decision is even 
unconscious, as if the deciding one was free only by letting himself be 
affected by his own decision and as if it came to him from the other. The 
consequences of such heteronomy seem redoubtable but it would be unjust to 
evade its necessity. Even if time and prudence, the patience of knowledge and 
the mastery of conditions were hypothetically unlimited, the decision would 
be structurally finite, however late it came—a decision of urgency and 
precipitation, acting in the night of nonknowledge and nonrule. Not of the 
absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules that by 
definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as such 
(255). 
The judgment of such decision of justice is like madness, “a madness because such 
decision is even unconscious, as if the deciding one was free only by letting himself 
be affected by his own decision and as if it came to him from the other.” It reveals the 
instantaneousness of the action of justice as the latter requires a decision of urgency 
which is like a ‘revolutionary instant.’ It is neither previously deliberated nor does it 
give birth to an expected result.  
Moreover, this decision of urgency or this revolutionary instant has an 
existential character, and the latter is particularly represented by Derrida’s point that 
“the decision always marks the interruption of the juridico-, ethico-, or 
politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.” In other words, 
at the moment of justice, existence always precedes rational deliberation. In the case 
of the FDW immigrants in Singapore in Pheng Cheah’s Inhuman Conditions, the 
cordial relation between Singapore, the labor-importing country and Philippine, the 
labor-exporting country, is suddenly interrupted by an instantaneous riot ignited by 
the death penalty of a Philippine maid, Flor Contemplacion, who is accused of 
murdering her friend Delia Maga, another Philippine maid, and a four-year-old 
Chinese boy who was Maga’s charge (232-233): 
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Widespread public outrage in the Philippines quickly gathered momentum. 
Communist guerrillas threatened to exact “revolutionary justice” against 
responsible Filipino officials and warned of threats to the safety of 
Singaporean diplomats in the country if Contemplacion was executed. When 
Singapore denied Ramos’s appeal for clemency and his request for a retrial, 
church, human-rights, and feminist groups were outraged. A demonstration of 
1500 people occurred outside the Singapore embassy, which also received 
many abusive and threatening phone calls. Following the hanging, 2000 
people participated in a nighttime prayer vigil outside the embassy. The mayor 
of Davao City, the fourth-largest city in the Philippines, burned a Singapore 
flag, and its city councilors resolved to ban the sale and distribution of 
Singaporean products (234). Through her sufferings and subsequent death, 
Contemplacion became an icon for the plight of all overseas Filipino workers 
caused by the labor-export policy of their state and its failure to safeguard the 
rights of workers who are so crucial to the nation’s economic development. 
Media reports and editorials in the Philippines variously described her as the 
“Flower of National Rage,” a national martyr, and a “national saint.” (235).  
This riot does not completely rescind the law concerning immigration of FDWs in 
both Philippine and Singapore. But it belongs to what Walter Benjamin calls the 
“founding violence” which is discussed by Derrida in the second half of Force of Law. 
Namely, a violence which could overthrow a law and found a new one. It perfectly 
exemplifies, as Derrida indicates, that justice is “a finite moment of urgency and 
precipitation” (255). Or, in Pheng Cheah’s own language, the “resistant subject who is 
opposed to and seeks to regulate the inhuman forces of global capital” is the 
“’differance’ inscribed within the inhuman force field that he or she seeks to transcend 
and overcome” (180); “the small contaminated victories of human rights are not the 
determinate negation of the inhuman but its differance, the other of the inhuman 
‘different and deferred in the economy of the same’” (265-266).  
       In Derrida’s view, the decision of justice is not only an instantaneous action 
without rational deliberation, but could also not be the equivalence of any type of 
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messianic hope which always promises people a supposedly better future, and expect 
people to wait for the coming of the future with patience. For Derrida, both rational 
deliberation and messianic hope depoliticize the possible instantaneous action of 
justice or revolution. The decision of justice is neither to deliberate a future nor to 
wait for the coming of a future. On the contrary, for Derrida, every moment is a 
possible moment for its coming. As Derrida contends:  
But for this very reason, it has perhaps an avenir, precisely, a “to-come” 
[a-venir] that one will have to rigorously distinguish from the future. The 
future loses the openness, the coming of the other (who comes), without 
which there is no justice; and the future can always reproduce the present, 
announce itself or present itself as a future present in the modified form of the 
present. Justice remains to come, it remains by coming, it has to come, it is 
to-come, the to-come, it deploys the very dimension of events irreducibly to 
come. It will always have it, this a-venir, and will always have had it. Perhaps 
this is why justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical or political concept, open 
up to the avenir the transformation, the recasting or refounding of law and 
politics. “Perhaps”--- one must always say perhaps for justice. There is an 
avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is 
possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations 
and so forth. (256-257).  
The word ‘perhaps’ clearly delineates the paradoxical character of the decision of 
justice in this sense: on the one hand, every moment could be a moment for its 
coming. But, on the other hand, every moment could also not be a moment for its 
‘to-come’. This paradox of the possibility of the decision of justice is visualized by 
Derrida as a ‘ghost’: 
The undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost at least, but an essential 
ghost, in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness 
deconstructs from within all assurance of presence, all certainty or all alleged 
criteriology assuring us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very event 
of a decision (253).  
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The ghost here represents a kind of uncertain expectation of an alternative justice for 
the minorities suffering from injustice. It is an expectation of justice but is an 
expectation with uncertainty. In other words, it is not the expectation of a specific 
futural moment as the coming moment of justice. As Derrida argues, “the future can 
always reproduce the present, announce itself or present itself as a future present in 
the modified form of the present.” If the ‘future’ here represents a kind of pessimistic 
attitude toward all the previous religious/political messianism which all eventually 
failed, the ‘ghost’ represents a radically affirmative attitude of the possibility of justice 
against this pessimism: justice is always already to come and, hence, the time of its 
coming is never quite certain, never guaranteed.  
Third, as I mentioned before, Derrida does not appeal to a kind of justice 
beyond law or justice transcending law or, more in general, a kind of ‘pure justice’ 
that would remain uncontaminated by any type of unjust law. For Derrida, this kind of 
idealistic justice is completely untenable and does not have any real possibility of 
impacting on our world. In this sense, Derrida’s attitude toward justice is a kind of 
combination of realism and idealism, or a combination of pessimism and optimism, or 
a ‘realistic idealism’ and ‘pessimistic hope.’ In his own words:  
This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the 
unpresentable over the determinable, cannot and should not serve as an alibi 
for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, 
between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving 
idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can 
always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It is always 
possible, and this is part of the madness of which we were speaking. An 
absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the opening of 
the call to justice, a call that is always wounded (257). Not only must one [il 
faut] calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the 
incalculable, and negotiate without a rule that would not have to be 
reinvented there where we are “thrown,” there where we find ourselves; but 
one must [il faut] do so and take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find 
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ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality, politics, or 
law, beyond the distinctions between national and international, public and 
private, and so on (257).  
This gesture of hope could also be elaborated in this way: we still have to have the 
hope even if we realize the harsh truth that the unjust always constitutes part of our 
living world. The incalculable and giving idea of justice is “always very close to the 
bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse 
calculation”. Moreover, justice is not only inseparable from the unjust, but it is the 
unjust that makes the radical hope of justice meaningful. Or, in Derrida’s own 
language, “an absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the 
opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded”.  
       The interruption of the Singapore-Philippine relation by the unexpected event 
of the Flor Contemplacion trial propels both of the two sides to make changes to its 
immigration policy. The Ramos Regime in Philippine passes the Migrant Workers and 
Overseas Filipinos Act (1995) which aims at appeasing the riots caused by the Flor 
Contemplacion event (238). It makes the statement that  
The state does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain 
economic growth and achieve national development. The existence of the 
overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity 
and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizen shall not, 
at any time, be compromised and violated (238).  
But a representative of the Philippine government quickly makes another 
announcement to reassure the significance of the economic tie between Philippine and 
Singapore based upon the neo-liberal global order: 
       On July 15, 1995, Senator Blas Ople observed: “it is in our interest that 
normal relations be restored with Singapore. Beyond the emotions generated 
by the Contemplacion case, Philippines-Singaporean relations are very 
important to the Philippines and ASEAN. At some point differences must be 
allowed to lapse into history and we want to begin anew (238-239).  
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As Derrida indicates, such an unexpected interruption of the unjust law cannot change 
the neo-liberal order itself, and it is easily reappropriated by the neo-liberal order 
which drives the immigration of the FDWs between Singapore and Philippine. Or in 
Derrida’s own language, “a call that is always wounded”.  
Here Derrida adopts a very Hegelian rhetoric to describe the relation between 
justice and the unjust law: a call that is always wounded, or justice that is always 
contaminated by the unjust. In this sense, what Derrida and Hegel have in common is 
that for both of them, justice is not an idea purely transcending reality. In reality, 
justice could only be seen in a specific situation in which people are aware of the 
injustice of the law and begin to wrestle with it, struggling against it and having the 
hope of justice. A typical Hegelian dialect has three steps: first, an idea is an idea 
which is pure in itself and has nothing to do with the reality; second, the pure idea 
encounters the reality, which contradicts it, making it untrue or contentious; third, the 
final reconciliation of the ideal and the real is preached by Hegel as the necessary 
result of the contradiction. What is ideal and what is real are completely in harmony 
with each other. The job that Derrida does here is the second step in the Hegelian 
dialect, but the final step does not exist for Derrida: Derrida openly rejects any type of 
the imagination of a supposedly best society in which nothing is unjust. 
       Forth, Derrida understands his critique of the unjust law as a continuation of 
the struggle against authoritarianism and the emancipation of human in a historical 
view. in this sense, Derrida is ‘waving Enlightenment against Enlightenment’. In other 
words, Derrida understands his own work as a continuation of the “classical 
emancipation ideal,” like French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the abolition of 
slavery. As Derrida indicates, 
Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not 
ever be total. To keep this from being a truism, or a triviality, one must 
recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization 
obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law 
such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for 
example in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of 
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slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in 
progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to 
me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. One cannot attempt to 
disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, without at least 
some thoughtlessness and without forming the worst complicities. It is true 
that it is also necessary to re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of 
emancipation, enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the 
strange structure we have been describing (257-258).  
The classical emancipation ideal which remains incomplete has to be continued and 
deepened. In “Force of Law”, Derrida does not unpack this thought. It is unpacked in 
Specters of Marx, where Derrida argues that the classical ideal of emancipation, 
enfranchisement and liberation not only has to be continued, but can only be 
continued as the forgetting of them as previous great historical moments. As Derrida 
indicates: 
       The dividing line passes between a mechanical reproduction of the specter 
and an appropriation that is so alive, so interiorizing, so assimilating of the 
inheritance and of the “spirits of the past” that it is none other than the life of 
forgetting, life as forgetting itself, and the forgetting of the maternal in order 
to make the spirit live in oneself (2006, 136). One must forget the specter and 
the parody, Marx seems to say, so that history can continue. But if one is 
content to forget it, then the result is bourgeois platitude: life, that’s all. So 
one must not forget it, one must remember it but while forgetting it enough, 
in this very memory, in order to “find again the spirit of the revolution 
without making its specter return” (137-138).  
For Derrida, the revival of the classical emancipation ideal, including Marxism, does 
not suggest that people treat them as what Nietzsche means the “monumental history”, 
namely, certain great historical moments which are expected to reoccur. On the 
contrary, any instantaneous revolution against oppression or social inequality is 
naturally a continuation of the classical ideal of emancipation. In other words, what 
continues the classical emancipation ideal is not the memory of several great 
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historical events, but the possibility of new revolutionary action17. This possibility of 
new revolutionary action, as a kind of ‘radical alterity’, interrupts any type of 
historical necessity or historical teleology, making a ‘future of alterity’ which both 
interrupts and preconditions the mere progress of history. In this sense, deconstruction 
is also concerned with the metaphysical question of temporality: in Derrida’s view, 
history is not in any sense pre-determined by certain type of ‘necessity’ or ‘teleology’, 
not is it merely a flat moving from one presence to another one. Temporality is 
preconditioned by the possibility of an alterity interrupting its sequence18  
																																								 																				 	
17 In Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida, Hent de Vries talks 
about this in relation to Kant’s theory of radical evil. In Kant’s view, to achieve moral perfection is not 
merely a progress from morally imperfect to morally perfect. In this sense, Kant’s thought parallels 
Derrida’s in a sense that, for Kant, the moral perfection is a kind of “radical alterity” which interrupts 
the “morally imperfect status” with the help of God. As Hent indicates, “postulating the possibility of 
the worst (radical evil) at the very root of the possibility of the best does not prevent Kant from 
entertaining yet another possibility, that of a sudden revolution, a ‘change of heart.’ This change does 
not announce itself as the result of a moral progress in time, but is its precondition, commencement, or 
promise. Rather, its revolution has a specific, circular, or elliptical temporality of its own. It is at once 
timeless, no more time and more than one time or more of one time—and the heartbeat or the inner 
clock of reason’s unseen yet, Kant believes, providential movement throughout the universal history of 
humankind.” De Vries, Hent, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, 105. However, for Kant, the possibility of doing 
evil, which is defined by Kant as ‘radical evil’, cannot be completely eliminated. The radical evil in 
Kant’s view does not originate in the imperfect human nature which is ineradicable. Ibid., 108. Kant’s 
purpose here is merely to affirm the possibility of doing evil, and this possibility has a lot to do with 
religious fanaticism or religious sectarianism, which is prohibited in public realm, though Kant believes 
that Christianity helps people to follow their self-legislated moral law. In “Faith and Knowledge: the 
two sources of ‘religion’ at the limits of reason alone”, Derrida has a different understanding of ‘radical 
evil’. For Derrida, radical evil is not merely the opposite of moral perfection which Kant expects 
people to achieve, it also represents certain kind of ‘radical alterity’ which interrupts and preconditions 
the progress of history. As Hent indicates, “if the turn to religion as well as the ‘return of the religious’ 
are, as Derrida suggests, intrinsically bound up with ‘at least certain phenomena of radical evil,’ then 
the following question should also be asked: ‘Does radical evil destroy or institute the possibility of 
religion,’ as well as that of ethics and politics?” Ibid., 110. Since the Kantian moral is deeply linked to 
Christianity but radical evil is associated with religious fanaticism, or non-Christian religions, radical 
evil in Derrida’s view has a Euro-centric prejudice. See Derrida, Jacques. “Faith and Knowledge: The 
Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of reason Alone”. In “Acts of Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar, 
London: Routledge, 2002, 50-51.  
18 The Derridian temporality has its root in Heidegger but is also different from Heidegger. Pheng 
Cheah, in What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature, makes this explicit: 
“although Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that time ‘is not a being at all . . . but rather temporalizes 
itself,’ time still belongs to the order of presence because, first, it is the ground of being, and second, 
self-temporalization implies a form of presence--- the presence to self in temporalization--- that is 
superior to the presence of merely objective beings. See Heidegger, martin. Being and Time. New York: 
Harper & Row, 2008, 302, 328. But if temporalization refers to a radical alterity that is not temporal 
and not of the order of being, then temporality cannot be grounded in the unity of self-temporalization 
proper to human beings. Derrida suggests that time is given by what is entirely other to being. The 
other is not temporal, not in the sense that it is an absolute being that transcends time, but rather 
because it is not a form of presence and exceeds the order of being. What is a World? On Postcolonial 
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1.2.The Law-Giving, the Law-Preserving and the Divine Violence: Derrida on 
Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence 
       The four points that I have elaborated from the third Aporia in “Force of Law” 
reveal Derrida’s attitude toward the tension between justice and the unjust law. Based 
upon this, there is another question which has to be answered: what is the legislative 
power that makes what is legal just? Or, where does the legislative power come from? 
This is the reason why in the second part of Force of Law, Derrida turns to Walter 
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, introducing the problem of violence into his 
interrogation of the problem of justice and law. As Derrida indicates in the first half of 
Force of law, the paradox of law is that, it makes what is legal just, or there is no 
justice beyond or outside law. In other words, what is just has also to be the legal. The 
illegal justice is not justice. Derrida attempts to disclose this paradox of law, making 
the uncovering of this paradox as a critique of law from its internal logic of operation. 
In this sense, if the unjust law, though unjust, still has to be trusted as just since it is 
legal, there has to be certain kind of power which guarantees its operation, silencing 
any attempt to question its legitimacy as the just. This administrative power which 
guarantees the operation of law, or in the Foucauldian lexicon, governmentality, or in 
the Marxian words, the state apparatus, is defined by Walter Benjamin as the 
law-preserving violence. The law-preserving violence has two implications regarding 
the relation between law and violence. First, it suggests the antagonism between law 
and violence, or law is against violence. However, this elimination of 
individual-based violence in fact suggests that the use of violence is monopolized by 
the law-preserving violence, or the state apparatus19. Namely, private individuals are 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 													 	
Literature as World Literature. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016, 165; it refers to an otherness that 
cannot be reduced to being and presence.” Ibid., 166.  
19 Characteristic of these, so far as the individual as legal subject is concerned, is the tendency to deny 
the natural ends of such individual in all those cases in which such ends could, in a given situation, be 
usefully pursued by violence. This means: this legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual 
ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power. it can 
be formulated as a general maxim of present-day European legislation that all the natural ends of 
individuals must collide with legal ends if pursued with a greater or lesser degree of violence. From 
this maxim it follows that law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the 
legal system. It will be argued that a system of legal ends cannot be maintained if natural ends are 
anywhere still pursued violently. In the first place, however, this is mere dogma. To counter it one 
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not permitted to use violence against other private individuals, or to kill other people; 
only the state is permitted by law to kill the people who use violence privately. This 
monopolization of the use of violence by the law-preserving violence, or the state 
apparatus, is what actually makes the unjust law operative.  
       The law-preserving violence, as what makes law operative, is still not the 
origin of law. The significance of the law-preserving violence could only be revealed 
as a consequence of the law-founding violence. In Benjamin’s view, the law-founding 
violence suggests that law is nothing other than the result of certain type of 
antagonism, or the struggle and contestation between different groups of people. Law, 
as the natural consequence of the antagonism between people, is in fact a negotiation, 
or a balance between different interests20. The law-founding violence suggests a 
transition from civil war or contested democracy to normalized social stability, and 
the purpose of law-preserving violence is undoubtedly to maintain social stability. In 
this sense, Benjamin’s critique of violence is almost a Marxian interpretation of law 
and its institutional operation in modern world, and this Marxian view is particularly 
represented by his appropriation of George Sorel’s Reflections on Violence. In the 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 													 	
might perhaps consider the surprising possibility that the law’s interest in a monopoly of violence 
vis-à-vis individuals is explained not by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by the 
intention of preserving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by 
the ends that is may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law.” See Benjamin, Walter. “Critique 
of Violence”. In Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, edited by Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings, 
237-252. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2002, 238-239. This is actually a point 
that Derrida and Benjamin have in common: “from the moment that this positive, positing and 
founding character of another law is recognized, modern law refuses the individual subject all right to 
violence.” See Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law”, 274.  
20 “We are above all obligated to note that a totally nonviolent resolution of conflicts can never lead to 
a legal contract. For the latter, however peacefully it may have been entered into by the parties, leads 
finally to possible violence. It confers on each party the right to resort to violence in some form against 
the other, should he break the agreement. Not only that; like the outcome, the origin of every contract 
also points toward violence. It need not be directly present in it as lawmaking violence, but is 
represented in it insofar as the power that guarantees a legal contract is, in turn, of violent origin even if 
violence is not introduced into the contract itself.” Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 243-244; “Where 
frontiers are decided, the adversary is not simply annihilated; indeed, he is accorded rights even when 
the victor’s superiority in power is complete. And these are, in a demonically ambiguous way, “equal” 
rights: for both parties to the treaty, it is the same line that may not be crossed. Here appears, in a 
terribly primitive form, the mythic ambiguity of laws that may not be “infringed”---- the same 
ambiguity to which Anatole France refers satirically when he says, “Poor and rich are equally 
forbidden to spend the night under the bridges.” It also appears that Sorel touches not merely on a 
cultural-historical truth but also on a metaphysical truth when he surmises that in the beginning all right 
was the prerogative of kings or nobles--- in short, of the mighty; and that, mutatis mutandis, it will 
remain so as long as it exists. For from the point of view of violence, which alone can guarantee law, 
there is no equality, but at the most equally great violence.” Ibid., 249.    
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modern world, the parliament, as the law-making organization in a country, should be 
the place where the “founding violence”, the contested democracy, or the struggle 
between different partisans happens. However, for the sake of social stability, and in 
particular, for the interests of the capitalists, modern parliamentary democracy 
depoliticizes itself by making the law-making process a pre-arranged process divested 
of violence, or any type of contestation21. This depoliticization is better exemplified 
by Benjamin, as well as George Sorel’s critique of the political strike. In order to 
prevent the exacerbation of the tension between capitalists and workers, workers are 
allowed, regulated by law and under the control of the police, to strike. This kind of 
strike in no sense changes the fundamental relation between capitalists and workers. 
In return, the capitalists usually remunerate them and make certain promises of 
increasing salaries or improving working conditions. The result is that, the legally 
permitted strike only makes the employment relation more stabilized. But if a 
spontaneous strike launched by workers, aiming at overthrowing the state apparatus or 
abolishing the law, it becomes a totally different thing. This is what according to 
George Sorel, the difference between the political general strike and the proletarian 
																																								 																				 	
21 “When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the 
institution falls into decay. In our time, parliaments provide an example of this. They offer the familiar, 
woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to which they 
owe their existence. Accordingly, in Germany in particular, the last manifestation of such forces bore 
no fruit for parliaments. They lack the sense that they represent a lawmaking violence; no wonder they 
cannot achieve decrees worthy of this violence, but cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent 
manner of dealing with political affairs. This remains, however, a ‘product situated within the mentality 
of violence, no matter how it may disdain all open violence, because the effort toward compromise is 
motivated not internally but from outside, by the opposing effort, because no compromise, however 
freely accepted, it conceived without a compulsive character. ‘it would be better otherwise’ is the 
underlying feeling in every compromise. Nevertheless, however desirable and gratifying a flourishing 
parliament might be by comparison, a discussion of means of political agreement that are in principle 
nonviolent cannot be concerned with parliamentarianism. For what a parliament achieves in vital 
affairs can be only those legal decrees that in their origin and outcome are attended by violence.” Ibid., 
244. Derrida reiterates this point in Force of Law: “the first example chosen is that of the parliamentary 
of the time. If they offer a deplorable spectacle, it is because these representative institutions forget the 
revolutionary violence from which they are born. The parliaments live in forgetfulness of the violence 
from which they are born. This amnesiac denegation does not betray a psychological weakness; it is 
inscribed in their statue, and in their very structure. From then on, instead of reaching decisions 
commensurable or proportional to this violence and worthy of it, they practice the hypocritical politics 
of compromise. The concept of compromise, the denegation of open violence, the recourse to 
dissimulated violence belong to the spirit of violence, to the ‘mentality of violence’ that promotes 
acceptance of the adversary’s coercion both in order to avoid the worst and while saying, with the sigh 
of the parliamentarian, that this is certainly not ideal, that, no doubt, things would have been better 
otherwise but that, precisely, one could not do otherwise.” Derrida, “Force of Law”, 282-283.  
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general strike: “in contrast to this political general strike, the proletarian general strike 
sets itself the sole task of destroying state power” (2012, 246). The proletarian general 
strike will undoubtedly be suppressed since it is a strike which is not only illegal, but 
aims at abolishing law itself22.  
       Benjamin also explores the law-preserving violence from another perspective, 
the relation between violence as ‘fate’ and human vulnerability. The law-preserving 
violence is also defined by Benjamin as the mythic violence, in contrast to the divine 
violence. The mythic violence refers to the harsh truth that the transgression of law, 
even merely unintentional transgression, makes human life vulnerable to its violence, 
even the victim is innocent. As Benjamin argues, 
       How little such divine violence was, to the ancients, the law-preserving 
violence of punishment is shown by the heroic legends in which the hero--- 
for example, Prometheus--- challenges fate with dignified courage, fights it 
with varying fortunes, and is not left by the legend without hope of one day 
bringing a new law to men. It is really this hero and the legal violence of the 
myth native to him that the public tries to picture even now in admiring the 
miscreant (2002, 248). The act of establishing frontiers, however, is also 
significant for an understanding of law in another respect. Laws and 
circumscribed frontiers remain, at least in primeval times, unwritten laws. A 
man can unwittingly infringe upon them and thus incur retribution. For each 
intervention of law that is provoked by an offense against the unwritten and 
																																								 																				 	
22 “Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that 
of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions 
emerges in all its bitterness in the face of a revolutionary general strike. In this, labor will always 
appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse (since the right to strike was not 
‘so intended’) and will take emergency measures. For the state retains the right to declare that a 
simultaneous use of strikes in all industries is illegal, since the specific reasons for strikes admitted by 
legislation cannot be prevalent in every workshop. In this difference of interpretation is expressed the 
objective contradiction in the legal situation, whereby the state acknowledges a violence whose ends, 
as natural ends, it sometimes regards with indifference but in a crisis (the revolutionary general strike) 
confronts inimically. For however paradoxical this may appear at first sight, even conduct involving the 
exercise of a right can nevertheless, under certain circumstances, be described as violent. More 
specifically, such conduct, when active, may be called violent if it exercises a right in order to 
overthrow the legal system that has conferred it; when passive, it is nevertheless to be so described if it 
constitutes extortion in the sense explained above. It therefore reveals an objective contradiction in the 
legal situation, but not a logical contradiction in the law, if under certain circumstances the law meets 
the strikers, as perpetrators of violence, with violence.” Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 239-240.  
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unknown law is call “retribution” (in contradistinction to “punishment”). But 
however unluckily it may befall its unsuspecting victim, its occurrence is, in 
the understanding of the law, not chance, but fate showing itself once again 
in its deliberate ambiguity. Hermann Cohen, in a brief reflection on the 
ancients’ conception of fate, has spoken of the “inescapable realization” that 
it is “fate’s orders themselves that seem to cause and bring about this 
infringement, this offense.” Even the modern principle that ignorance of a 
law is not protection against punishment testifies to this spirit of law, just as 
the struggle over written law in the early period of the ancient Greek 
communities should be understood as a rebellion against the spirit of mythic 
statues (249).  
It is “fate’s orders themselves that seem to cause and bring about this infringement, 
this offense” alludes to the predatory function of the law-preserving violence. In other 
words, the infringement upon law and the punishment as the consequence of it are 
merely based upon the result of one’s action, but not the intention. This is also the 
reason why Benjamin argues that “all the violence imposed by fate, using justified 
means, were of itself in irreconcilable conflict with just ends”. One will be punished 
as long as one’s action infringes upon law, regardless of one’s motivation, even if the 
motivation is righteous. In this sense, the commonsense that “just ends can be attained 
by justified means, justified means used for just ends” has to be questioned: even 
justified means could result in unjust ends. This is exactly Derrida’s own argument in 
Force of Law. Combined with Benjamin, as well as Sorel’s advocacy of the 
proletarian general strike, the Prometheus here has a proletarian-revolutionary 
character: the proletarian strike will be punished mercilessly since it violates the 
justified means, or the law, even its motivation is just.  
       In the second half in “Force of Law”, Derrida’s interpretation of Walter 
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence suggests both Derrida’s debt to Benjamin and the 
divergence between them. First, Benjamin’s argument that law as the justified means 
does not necessarily result in just ends (247) is identical to Derrida’s own argument 
that law is not equivalent to justice (244). This is also where Derrida’s thought is in 
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debt to Benjamin. Namely, Benjamin’s analysis of the law-preserving violence 
explains how the dogma that law as justified means will necessarily result in just ends 
is paradoxical and self-undermining, and this is also what deconstruction as a 
methodology purports to. As Derrida indicates, “An effective critique must take issue 
with the body of law itself, in its head and in its members, with the laws and the 
particular usages that law adopts under the protection of its power” (275). The 
purpose of deconstruction is to disclose how the truth which seems self-logical is 
essentially self-contradictory, paradoxical and therefore is self-undermining. In the 
case of law, it reveals how law, the justified means with just ends could also be unjust, 
and the injustice of it is covered by its legitimacy as the justified means. Moreover, 
Benjamin’s critique of the law-preserving violence, especially his critique of 
militarism and police help Derrida to complete his own theory of law and justice. As 
Benjamin indicates, to criticize militarism and conscription merely from a pacifist or a 
human right perspective, arguing that all human should only be treated as ends rather 
than means, is inadequate, since “instead of attacking the legal system root and branch, 
they impugn particular laws or legal practices” 23  (242). Militarism has to be 
understood as part of the law-preserving violence, and the law-preserving logic is 
deeply inscribed in law. As Derrida indicates, “that which exists, which has 
consistency and that which at the same time threatens what exists belong inviolably to 
the same order, and this order is inviolable because it is unique; it can only be violated 
within itself” (275).  
																																								 																				 	
23 “Since conscription is a case of law-preserving violence that is not in principle distinguished from 
others, a really effective critique of it is far less easy than the declamations of pacifists and activists 
suggest. Rather, such a critique coincides with the critique of all legal violence--- that is, with the 
critique of legal or executive force---- and cannot be performed by any lesser program. More important 
is the fact that even the appeal, so frequently attempted, to the categorical imperative, with its doubtless 
incontestable minimum program--- act in such a way that at all times you use humanity both in your 
person and in the person of all others as an end, and never merely as a means--- is in itself inadequate 
for such a critique. For positive law, if conscious of its roots, will certainly claim to acknowledge and 
promote the interest of mankind in the person of each individual. It sees this interest in the 
representation and preservation of an order imposed by fate. While this view, which claims to preserve 
law in its very basis, cannot escape criticism, nevertheless all attacks that are made merely in the name 
of a formless “freedom” without being able to specify this higher order of freedom remain impotent 
against it. And they are most impotent of all when, instead of attacking the legal system root and 
branch, they impugn particular laws or legal practices that the law, of course, takes under the protection 
of its power, which resides in the fact that there is only one fate and that what exists, and in particular 
what threatens, belongs inviolably to its order.” Ibid., 241-242.  
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But what Derrida does to differentiate his own thought from Benjamin is that 
he furthers Benjamin’s critique of the law-preserving violence, militarism, police and 
death penalty by blurring Benjamin’s original distinction between the law-founding 
violence and the law-preserving violence: in Benjamin’s original account, the 
law-preserving violence, especially the police as the degeneration of it, is what makes 
the law-founding violence depoliticized; the law-founding violence therefore becomes 
institutionalized and loses its original vitality. Rather than understanding 
law-preserving violence as a kind of degeneration of the law-founding violence, in 
Derrida’s view, the hypocrisy of law, its apparent legitimacy and its essential injustice, 
and its self-defensing mechanism, the law-preserving violence, is already part of the 
law-founding violence, or is already part of law when law is initially established24. Or, 
in a Derridian language, this iterability, the self-correct and self-repeated legitimacy 
of law, “inscribe preservation in the essential structure of foundation” (278).  
       In fact, for Benjamin, the relation between law-founding violence and 
law-preserving violence is merely part of his hierarchy of violence, in which the 
divine violence, a totally non-secular force, takes the top position in it. The relation 
between these three types of violence is like a chain of degeneration: the 
law-preserving violence, the violence which has merely secular utility as a means 
adopted by the state apparatus to oppress civil disobedience, is at the bottom of 
Benjamin’s hierarchy. What is in the middle is the law-founding violence, the 
																																								 																				 	
24	 As Derrida indicates: “For beyond Benjamin’s explicit purpose, I shall propose the interpretation 
according to which the very violence of the foundation or positing of law must envelop the violence of 
the preservation of law and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence in 
that it calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to 
heritage and to tradition, to partaking. A foundation is a promise. Every positing permits and promises, 
posits ahead; it posits by setting and by promising. And even if a promise is not kept in fact, iterability 
inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation. Thus it inscribes the 
possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary. Better, or worse, it is inscribed in this law of 
iterability; it stands under its law or before its law. Consequently, there is no more pure foundation or 
pure position of law, and so a pure founding violence, than there is a purely preserving violence. 
Positing is already iterability, a call for self-preserving repetition. Preservation in its turn refounds, so 
that it can preserve what it claims to found. Thus, there can be no rigorous opposition between positing 
and preserving, only what I will call (and Benjamin does not name it) a differential contamination 
between the two, with all the paradoxes that this may lead to. No rigorous distinction between a general 
strike and a partial strike, nor, in George Sorel’s sense, between a general political strike and a general 
proletarian strike. Deconstruction is also the thought of this differential contamination--- and the 
thought taken by the necessity of this contamination.” Derrida, “Force of Law”, 272.  
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violence as antagonism, the origin of law as the balance between power or negotiation. 
But what is superior to both of them is the divine violence, the violence which 
resembles George Sorel’s general proletarian strike, which only punishes the vicious 
without hurting the just. As Benjamin contends: 
       Far from inaugurating a purer sphere, the mythic manifestation of immediate 
violence shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal violence, and 
turns suspicion concerning the latter into certainty of the perniciousness of its 
historical function, the destruction of which thus becomes obligatory. This 
very task of destruction poses again, ultimately, the question of a pure 
immediate violence that might be able to call a halt to mythic violence. Just 
as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the 
divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythic 
violence is law-making, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets 
boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at 
one guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, 
the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling 
blood. For with mere life, the rule of law over the living ceases. Mythic 
violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake; divine violence is 
pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice, 
the second accepts it (249-250).  
This clear elaboration of the difference between divine violence and mythic violence 
reveals Benjamin’s attitude toward justice and law: almost like Derrida, Benjamin 
appeals to a kind of justice beyond law, or the corrupted law as the mythic/the 
law-preserving violence, the force of the police. This appeal draws a clear distinction 
between the secularly unjust and the divinely righteous. Namely, if the secular world 
is corrupted and unjust, there has to be a kind of justice beyond or transcending 
secular authority.  
Besides The Critique of Violence, Benjamin adopts a similar logic in The 
Task of Translation, in dealing with the problem of the possibility of rendering one 
language into another completely. For Benjamin, the notion that the task of translation 
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is to render one language into another one is essentially wrong. It is always 
impossible to completely render a text from one language into another one. Thus, in 
Benjamin’s view, the translator should understand translation as understanding the 
language from which one translates and the language into which one translates as 
parts of a bigger whole, a kind of pure language which transcends all specific 
languages but simultaneously reveals itself in every language. As Benjamin argues:  
       Fragments of a vessel that are to be glued together must match one another in 
the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same 
way a translation, instead of imitating the sense of the original, must lovingly 
and in detail incorporate the original’s way of meaning, thus making both the 
original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, 
just as fragments are part of a vessel. A real translation is transparent; it does 
not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, 
as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the 
more fully (2002, 260).  
The significance of the pure language as a meta-language of all languages in 
translation is that it preserves the particularity/non-translatability of every language 
when one attempts a translation of it. It makes a coexistence of two languages in a 
translation possible, but this coexistence of the two languages is based upon the 
assumption that they are representations of a more primordial language. Likewise, 
only the divine violence can preserve the particular life of each individual, since the 
secular use of violence by state only sacrifices human life when law is violated by an 
individual life, even this violation does not deserve such a severe punishment/ 
retribution, or in Benjamin’s own language, “mythic violence is bloody power over 
mere life for its own sake, but divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake 
of the living” (250). In one word, for Benjamin, this perfect unification of a 
meta-language and particular languages, or a unification of divinity and individual 
human life is possible and is the only way to preserve the particularity of a language 
or an individual life.  
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       The critique of the metaphysical assumption behind this perfect unification of 
the particularity of language/individual life and meta-language/divinity is where 
Derrida distances his position from Benjamin. In Derrida’s view, this metaphysical 
device that Benjamin adopts in his critiques of translation and mythic/state violence 
only makes the use of language by translator or the use of violence by state a kind of 
usurpation of the orthodox or a superfluous supplement of the original, and therefore 
does not really help to disclose the operation of law itself or the 
possibility/impossibility of translation. The critique of this metaphysical device, 
which plays a pivotal role in Derrida’s deconstruction, already happens in his early 
work Of Grammatology. As Derrida indicates, the dichotomy of civilization and 
nature is where Levi-Strauss’s anthropology overlaps Rousseau, since both of them 
insist that the pure nature of human world could be corrupted by civilization. 
Especially, in Levi-Strauss’s anthropological research, this corruption of nature by 
civilization is how the European colonization of the non-European world happens: by 
introducing ‘western civilization’ to the native Nambikwara people, the European 
colonizers corrupt the uncontaminated native mind. This corruption of nature, 
according to Levi-Strauss, could be represented by an experiment that the 
anthropologist has with the native children: the native Nambikwara people have their 
own names but the use of their names is prohibited; when the anthropologist allows 
them to use their names, they begin to take revenge upon their enemies by telling the 
anthropologist secretly the name of one’s enemy as a way to revenge (2016, 120). In 
Of Grammatology, Derrida’s critique of the nature/civilization binary is mainly from 
the perspective of metaphysics, but the political implication of his critique of 
Levi-Strauss’s anthropological research is further developed by Gayatri Spivak in her 
post-colonial studies of India. To imagine the non-European natives as either the 
barbarous, the morally inferior kind or the people with uncorrupted nature, the 
morally superior kind, fails to take into account the ‘non-representability’ of the voice 
of the non-European natives themselves. This is also what Spivak’s most celebrated 
theory ‘can the subaltern speak’ means: it does not suggest that the true voice of the 
Indians is deliberatively manipulated by European colonizers so that the task of the 
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post-colonial researchers is to rescue the deliberatively forgotten voice of the Indian 
subalterns from the narration of the European agents; on the contrary, what it indicates 
is that the voice of the subalterns can never be fully represented, via either the 
perspective of the Europeans or a ‘native perspective’ as Levi-Strauss advocates. 
Likewise, to merely condemn the use of violence by state as the ‘corruption’ of 
violence, the ‘degeneration’ of divine violence, or as morally inferior to divine 
violence, does not helps to penetrate into the mechanism of law itself, namely, how 
law could be unjust, just like what Pheng Cheah demonstrates in his field work of 
Singaporean labor.  
Derrida’s suspicion of Benjamin’s divine violence in “Force of Law”, which, 
as a kind of extraordinary remedy for the corrupted secular violence, the 
law-preserving violence, especially the violence of the police, parallels his critique of 
Benjamin’s pure language in “Des Tours de Babel”, which, as a solution to the 
problem concerning the impossibility of rendering completely one language into 
another one. The authoritarian character of both the divine violence and the pure 
language suggests the divergence between Benjamin and Derrida: though Benjamin 
deals with the kind of question that Derrida is interested in, deconstruction is a 
radically democratic gesture which is irreconcilable with any type of, either apparent 
or potential, authoritarianism. In this sense, Derrida’s reinterpretation of Benjamin’s 
“Critique of Violence” has a broader implication, which suggests the difference 
between his point of view and modern European anti-democratic thoughts. The 
argument that Derrida makes in “Force of Law”, namely, law is not equivalent to 
justice, is also made exactly by two anti-democratic thinkers in the 20th century, Leo 
Strauss and Carl Schmitt, whose thoughts share great similarity with Walter 
Benjamin’s order of violence which positions the divine violence as morally superior 
to the secular use of violence by state. What these three thinkers have in common is 
that for all of them, the rule of law is not equivalent to justice or is insufficient for 
justice, and the critique of the rule of law is used by them as a rationale to advocate 
certain type of political-religious authority: namely, for all of them, justice could only 
be represented by a kind of supreme authority, rather than by law as a kind of 
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man-made instrumental mean for maintaining secular order. This purely just authority 
could be either the divine violence in Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, or the rule of 
the wise man in Leo Strauss’s account, or the sovereignty in Carl Schmitt’s view25. 
But what Derrida means is totally different: it means the possibility of certain 
																																								 																				 	
25 To compare Leo Strauss’s point of view of justice and law with Benjamin and Derrida on the same 
issue is illuminating, though Leo Strauss’s question is not exactly the same as what Benjamin and 
Derrida deal with here. For instance, in On Tyranny, a reinterpretation of ancient Greek philosopher 
Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, Leo Strauss points out that a liberal society with 
democracy and rule of law is potentially unstable and will possibly degenerate into tyranny, and this 
kind of degeneration is due to the moral/intellectual incompetence of the majority of average people. 
Leo Strauss’s political philosophy is based upon a Platonic view of social psychology. Namely, there is 
a strong correlation between the mental order, the order of the soul of people and the social order, or 
between the internal world and the external world. If the concern of the majority of people in a society 
is merely power, wealth and vanity, the society will easily degenerate into tyranny, since people will 
naturally worship the one who is able to enrich and empower them by his own wealth and authority. 
Leo Strauss’s point of view is even more “pessimistic” than Plato in a sense that in his view, in any 
human society, there is merely a very small number of people, a really “minority” who are morally and 
intellectually competent in a Platonic sense: namely, their life is a self-perfection of virtue and pursuit 
of wisdom. Based upon this assumption, Leo Strauss argues that the best society, or the only way to 
completely prevent a society from degenerating into tyranny, is to let this tiny amount of “noble-minds” 
rule the majority of the average mediocre. However, since the elites have completely no interest in 
politics and are really sick of the majority of the mediocre, they are unwilling to bear the burden of 
saving a society from its potential tyranny. Thus, the rule of law is the only practicable solution but is 
merely the second best. As Leo Strauss indicates, “It is obvious that absolute rule of the unwise is less 
desirable than their limited rule: the unwise ought to rule under law. But in the absence of absolute rule 
of the wise on the one hand, and on the other hand of a degree of abundance which is possible only on 
the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its terrible hazards, the apparently just alternative 
to aristocracy open or disguised will be permanent revolution, i.e., permanent chaos in which life will 
be not only poor and short but brutish as well. It would not be difficult to show that the classical 
argument cannot be disposed of as easily as is now generally thought, and that liberal or constitutional 
democracy comes closer to what the classics demanded than any alternative that is viable in our age. In 
the last analysis, however, the classical argument derives its strength from the assumption that the wise 
do not desire to rule.” See, Strauss, Leo. On Tyranny. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 193-194. Based 
upon this, Leo Strauss also makes the argument that law is not equivalent to justice. Ibid., 103-105. But 
his rationale to make this argument is not that law itself is unjust, like being contaminated by racism, 
for instance. His rationale is that law is not able to prevent a society from degenerating into tyranny, 
and this is due to the moral/intellectual incompetence of the majority of people, not because of the 
imperfection of law itself. Besides this, Benjamin makes a very similar point in Critique of Violence, in 
terms of the sanctity of life, and it is mentioned by Derrida in Force of Law. As Benjamin contends, to 
argue that the dignity of man relies upon the biological life of man is wrong, since the value of human 
being is more than the mere biological life: “man cannot, at any price, be said to coincide with the mere 
life in him, any more than it can be said to coincide with any other of his conditions and qualities, 
including even the uniqueness of his bodily person.” Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 251. As Derrida 
indicates, “in other words, what makes the worth of man, of his Dasein and of his life, is that he 
contains the potential, the possibility of justice, the avenir of justice, the avenir of his being-just, of his 
having-to-be just. What is sacred in his life is not his life but the justice of his life, say Benjamin; this 
critique of vitalism or biologism, if it also resembles one by a certain Heidegger and if it recalls some 
Hegel propositions, here proceeds like the awakening of a Judaic tradition.” Derrida, “Force of Law”, 
289. The difference that Benjamin makes here between the biological life of human and the dignity of 
human based upon one’s just character is exactly a Straussian point. Also, both Walter Benjamin and 
Leo Strauss are German Jewish thinkers. In a footnote, Derrida also mentions that Carl Schmitt has a 
similar point.  
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resistance, revolution or insurrection against the legally legitimized injustice. This 
does not mean that there is totally no overlapping between Derrida and these three 
thinkers. An apparent common ground between them is that all of them object to 
liberalism or modernity for which the rule of law is the synonym of justice. But their 
critiques of liberalism/modernity run into totally different directions. In fact, both 
Fascism and Marxism are discontents of liberalism/modernity. Derrida is certainly not 
unaware of this. In “Force of Law”, Derrida does not talk about Leo Strauss, but he 
refers to the friendship between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, the intellectual 
debt that Schmitt owes to Benjamin, as well as the rise of Nazism during the same 
period and Carl Schmitt’s notorious association with it, and these already suggest 
Derrida’s attitude toward them26. In Derrida’s view, Benjamin’s divine violence has a 
																																								 																				 	
26 “Zur Kritik der Gewalt is not only a critique of representation as perversion and fall of language, but 
of representation as a political system of formal and parliamentary democracy. From that point of view, 
this “revolutionary” essay (revolutionary in a style that is at once Marxist and messianic) belongs, in 
1921, to the great antiparliamentary and anti- “Aufklarung” wave upon which Nazism will have, as it 
were, surfaced and even “surfed” in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. Carl Schmitt, whom 
Benjamin admired and with whom he maintained a correspondence, congratulated him for this essay” 
Ibid., 259; “The chronology of such events cannot be taken for granted. And one will always find ways 
to support the hypothesis according to which Benjamin, already in 1921, was thinking about nothing 
other than the possibility of this final solution that all the better challenges the order of representation 
since it would perhaps have belonged in his eyes to radical evil, to the Fall as the fall of language in 
representation. There are many signs that indicate, were one to trust the constant logic of his discourse, 
that for Benjamin, after this unrepresentable thing that the ‘final solution’ will have been, not only are 
discourse and literature and poetry not impossible but more originarily and more eschatologically than 
ever, they would see themselves open to the dictation of the return or the still promised advent of a 
language of names, a language or a poetics of appellation, in opposition to a language of signs, of 
informative or communicative representation.” Ibid., 260. “It is in this context that certain limited but 
determinate affinities between Benjamin’s text and some texts by Carl Schmitt, and even by Heidegger, 
seem to me to deserve a serious interrogation. Not only because of the hostility to the Aufklarung, 
because of a certain interpretation of the polemos, of war, violence and language, but also because of a 
thematic of “destruction” that was very widespread at the time. Although Heideggerian Destruktion 
cannot be confused with the concept of “destruction” that was also at the center of Benjaminian 
thought, one may well ask oneself what such an obsession thematic might signify, what it prepares or 
anticipates between the two wars, all the more so in that, in every case, this destruction also sought to 
be the condition of an authentic tradition and memory.” Ibid., 261; “that is, the sense of a return to the 
past of a purer origin. This equivocation is typical enough to have fed many revolutionary discourses 
on the right and the left, particularly between the two wars. A critique of ‘degeneration’ (Entartung) as 
critique of a parliamentarism powerless to control the police violence that substitutes itself for it, is 
indeed a critique of violence on the basis of a ‘philosophy of history’: a putting into archeo-teleological, 
indeed, archeo-eschatological perspective that deciphers the history of law as a decline or decay 
(Verfall) since the origin. The analogy with Schmittian or Heideggerian schemes does not need to be 
emphasized. This triangle would have to be illustrated by a correspondence, I mean the epistolary 
correspondence that linked these three thinkers (Schmitt/Benjamin, Heidegger/Schmitt). It is still a 
matter of spirit and of revolution.” Ibid., 281-282.  
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Fascistic potentiality, though it seems more benevolent and righteous than Carl 
Schmitt’s open claim of statism.  
       The Derridian critique of law and violence here should be distinguished from 
another similar sort of critique, namely, Giorgio Agamben’s theory of inclusive 
exclusion, the state of exception, sovereignty and bared life in his Homo Sacer series. 
For Agamben, violence against a group of people begins when law is suspended by 
sovereignty. In other words, Agamben assumes that law and sovereign power are in 
the same institutional hierarchy in which sovereign power takes a position that is 
superior to law. In this sense, law is manipulable by sovereign power. On the other 
hands, for Agamben, the fact is not that everyone is equally protected by law. Namely, 
for those people whose life is not legally protected, the violence against them by 
sovereign power does not violate the law which protects the ‘insiders’, or the legal 
citizens. Rather than protected by law, the ‘outsiders’ in a society is often directly 
managed by sovereign power itself, in the form of deportation, imprisonment, or even 
concentration camp. However, when Derrida argues that law is inseparable from 
violence, this entanglement of law and violence does not indicate a suspension of law 
by another institutionally superior power. In other words, the problem that Derrida 
deals with in “Force of Law” is not a problem of sovereignty and law, or how law 
could be manipulated by sovereign power27. What Derrida wants to question is the 
normativity of law itself: namely, the legal criterion to differentiate what is just from 
what is unjust, or the violence against which group of people could be defined as 
																																								 																				 	
27 “The very emergence of justice and law, the instituting, founding, and justifying moment of law 
implies a performative force, that is to say always an interpretative force and a call to faith: not in the 
sense, this time, that law would be in the service of force, its docile instrument, servile and thus 
exterior to the dominant power, but rather in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal, 
more complex relation to what one calls force, power or violence. Justice—in the sense of droit (right 
or law)--- would not simply be put in the service of a social force or power, for example an economic, 
political, ideological power that would exist outside or before it and that is would have to 
accommodate or bend to when useful. Its very moment of foundation or institution, besides, is never a 
moment inscribed in the homogeneous fabric of a story or history, since it rips it apart with one 
decision. Yet, the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law, to making law, 
would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is 
neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no earlier and previously founding law, no preexisting 
foundation, could, by definition, guarantee or contradict or invalidate. No justificatory discourse could 
or should ensure the role of mater-language in relation to the performativity of institutive language or 
to its dominant interpretation.” Ibid., 241-242.  
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violence or an unjust action, but the violence against what kind of people is often not 
identified as violence or as the unjust. As Derrida indicates, the criterion of the just 
and the unjust, the violent and the non-violent, is a kind of normativity that is 
immanent in law, or is inherently inseparable from law. If racism could be an example 
of this, in a Derridian view, the violence against ethnical minorities which is not 
recognized as violence is the violence legitimized by law itself. In other words, racial 
prejudice is inseparable from law and this is the origin of violence. For Derrida, the 
Agambenian understanding of law, sovereign power and violence merely opposes law 
to sovereign power as the origin of violence, and thus fails to see the complexity of 
the normativity of law: to merely argue that sovereign power could violate the life of 
certain people without violating the law which protects the majority of legal citizens 
fails to see how the criterion of the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ are legitimized by 
law itself, and the violation of the life of the ‘outsiders’ could be legitimized by law  


















Chapter Two                                          
The Deconstructable and the Non-Deconstructable: Human Finitude and The 
Possibility of Justice 
      The ultimate question which could possibly be raised by Derrida’s essay 
“Force of Law” is if Derrida has his own normative ideal of justice when he makes 
the claim that law is not equivalent to justice. Or, if Derrida rejects both the 
superstition that law is equivalent to justice and certain type of “divine justice” 
beyond secular law, what kind of ‘justice’ beyond the unjust law is imagined by 
Derrida as a possible remedy for the unjust? In Radical Atheism: Derrida and the 
Time of Life, Martin Hagglund makes a significant clarification in terms of Derrida’s 
‘ideal of justice’, in “Force of Law”, for instance. In this book, Hagglund objects to 
all the arguments which make the claim that Derrida has his own ‘ideal justice’. As 
Martin Hagglund indicates, any type of the ideal of justice is untenable for Derrida. 
This does not suggest that Derrida is a ‘relativist’, in a sense that what is just and what 
is unjust makes no difference for him. In fact, the critique of the unjust law in “Force 
of Law” already indicates that Derrida’s viewpoint of justice is at least not, though not 
completely coterminous with, irreconcilable with the Kantian deontology that man 
could only be treated as ends rather than be used as means. In Hagglund’s view, what 
Derrida fights against is the attempt to eliminate the unjust or to cease violence by 
replacing evil with certain type of ‘permanent good’, namely, a kind of a-temporal 
norm of justice. In this view, the human world is always constituted by certain ‘evil’, 
or even the ‘radical evil’ in a Kantian sense, and therefore justice is only a possibility 
which has as its equivalent possibility the possibility of evil, a kind of ‘lesser unjust’ 
or ‘lesser violent’, rather than a kind of ‘permanent good’ which transcends time and 
allows no deviation from its ideal. The ideal norm of justice could always be killed or 
disproved when certain type of evil appears unexpectedly. In other words, if we 
expect the improvement, the lesser unjust or the lesser violent, to be a possibility in 
future, we should also acknowledge the harsh truth that evil is also an inevitable 
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possibility which is constitutive of the human condition28. Thus, in the case of Walter 
Benjamin, Carl Schmitt and George Sorel, their critique of the law-preserving 
violence, the force of the police or the parliamentary democracy contributes to 
Derrida’s thinking, since they prove how the normative could also be the unjust. But 
their solutions to these problems are not thereby fully compelling: in Derrida’s eyes, 
they all appeal to a kind of a-temporal/a-historical ideal of justice which denigrates 
not only the possibility of evil, but also the possibility to make improvement.  
       Hagglund’s contribution is that he highlights Derrida’s apparent objection to 
a-historical, timeless, transcendent ideals, as well as Derrida’ thought on temporality, 
possibility, contingency and finitude which could be traced back to the origin of his 
thought, namely, Heidegger in Being and Time. However, I would like to propose a 
more complex view of Derrida’s overall project. In fact, Derrida draws a distinction 
between what is ‘deconstructable’ and what is not ‘deconstructable’. The 
‘deconstructable’ is the kind of ideal which pretends to be universally valid truth but 
has its own finitude. Hence, this kind of ideal will be deconstructed, as long as its own 
finitude is revealed. In other words, as long as other alternative possibilities are 
revealed, its self-proclaimed ‘universal truth’ becomes invalid or unjustifiable. 
Derrida’s critique of ‘hospitality’, his critique of Levinas in “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, as well as his critique of Walter Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ in ‘Des 
Tours de Babel’ are examples of this procedure29. However, besides this, Derrida also 
																																								 																				 	
28 Hagglund suggests this in many places throughout his book. Here is an example: “Analogously, 
Derrida maintains that there can be no justice without the coming of time. the coming of time makes 
justice possible, since there would be no question of justice without unpredictable events that challenge 
the generality of the law. But by the same token, the coming of time makes absolute justice impossible, 
since it opens the risk that one has made or will have made unjust decisions. When Derrida argues that 
the coming of time is the un-deconstructable condition of justice, he thus emphasizes that it is a 
‘de-totalizing condition,’ which inscribes the possibility of corruption, evil, and mischief at the heart of 
justice itself. if this impossibility of absolute justice were to be overcome, all justice would be 
eliminated” See Hagglund, Martin. Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008, 123.  
29 As Derrida indicates in “Violence and Metaphysics”, “It is evident to separate the original possibility 
of speech--- as non-violence and gift--- from the violence necessary in historical actuality is to prop up 
thought by means of transhistoricity; which Levinas does explicitly, despite his initial critique of 
Husserlian ‘anhistoricism’; the anhistoricity of meaning at its origin is what profoundly separates 
Levinas from Heidegger, therefore. Since Being is history for the latter, it is not outside difference, and 
thus, it originally occurs as (nonethical) violence, as dissimulation of itself in its own unveiling” In 
Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, 148.   
	 41	
talks about those ideals which cannot be deconstructed. Derrida’s idea of justice in 
“Force of Law” is one of the best examples of this. As Derrida indicates, law is 
deconstructable, but justice is not. This does not suggest that the ‘un-deconstructable’ 
is certain type of transcendent ideal which always remains the same. This kind of 
ideal, as Derrida indicates, has to have ‘auto-immunity’ as part of itself. The Derridian 
lexicon of ‘auto-immunity’ means that nothing can always remain the same, and 
everything has to survive by certain type of self-mutilation, self-killing, or to 
transmute itself by incorporating what is initially ‘heterogeneous’ to it into itself. 
Justice in “Force of Law” is an example of this: there is no such kind of ‘transcendent 
justice’ which transcends all institutional settings. Justice could only be embodied in a 
type of law. Or, as Michael Naas contends, “this autoimmunity of democratic 
practices stems not from the fact, let me underscore, that democratic practices can 
never ‘live up to ‘ the true, democratic ideal, but from the fact that these practices 
must put to work an ‘ideal’ that, as we have seen, has nothing proper about it” 
(2008,137). This is also the reason why Derrida makes an apparently 
self-contradictory claim in “Force of Law”: namely, on the one hand, law is not 
equivalent to justice and it could be unjust; but, on the other hand, there is no justice 
beyond law, and only legally legitimized justice is justice. In one word, justice, no 
matter how ‘idealistic’ it is, has to accept the imperfect reality, or to accept the unjust 
law as its ‘body’, its secular incarnation, or, it can only survive in an imperfect, unjust 
world by incorporating the unjust into itself. This sounds pessimistic but is not the 
whole story yet. Based upon this, Derrida makes a further claim that this status of the 
unjust will be interrupted by another possibility of justice, a kind of ‘radical alterity’ 
in future. The process of this has been detailed by me in the first half of this thesis, 
with the help of the case presented by Pheng Cheah’s Derrida-inspired Post-Colonial 
Study work Inhuman Conditions. In one word, justice could survive and remains 
‘un-deconstructable’, but it survives via a quasi-Hegelian transformation of the 
‘negation of negation’, which finally negates the first negation, the reluctant 
acceptance of the unjust and brings justice back.  
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In this sense, the problem of Martin Hagglund’s reading is that he 
exaggerates the possibility of evil as an equal chance in comparison to the possibility 
of good or justice in Derrida’s thought. Thus, his reading makes Derrida more 
pessimistic. In Hagglund’s view, good and evil as equal possibilities and both of them 
are not under the control of human power. In other words, the possibility of justice is 
merely a chance or possibility for Derrida, rather than a kind of substantive 
improvement. What people can do is not to attempt any change to the ‘unjust’, though 
the attempt could be frustrated, but is merely to accept the possibilities passively, 
either the possibility of good or evil. This reading in fact deviates from Derrida’s 
original meaning in a sense that Derrida does not treat both good and evil as random 
possibilities and what people can do is merely to accept the chance. Derrida has more 
faith in the possibility of justice rather than the possibility of evil, though in his view, 
the effort to make the possibility of justice realizable could always be contaminated or 
frustrated by certain unpredictable evil. Derrida’s faith in the possibility of justice is 

















2.1. Cosmopolitanism Deconstructed: Translatability and Hospitality 
Derrida’s critique of Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” in “Des 
Tours de Babel” is an example to illustrate what is ‘deconstructable’ in Derrida’s view. 
Benjamin’s purpose to assume a ‘pure language’ which is like an ‘invisible whole’, 
transcending and subjugating two languages as parts to its totality is to assume that 
the existence of such a pure language guarantees the objectivity of translation (117). 
Otherwise, if without such a pure language, the translation is partial or unjust, losing 
the original meaning of the text in another language. However, in Derrida’s view, the 
pure language cannot play the role that Benjamin expects it to play, and the 
objectivity of translation does not really exist. This certainly does not suggest that a 
faithful and an unfaithful translation make no difference for Derrida. The Derridian 
viewpoint is that the norm or criterion of “faithful” translation is hard to be clearly 
and exactly defined. In other words, there could only be a more faithful translation, a 
less unfaithful translation, or a more unfaithful translation, a less faithful translation, 
but not an absolutely faithful translation. In this sense, to assume that a pure language 
exists and guarantees the objectivity or faithfulness of the translation merely, in 
Derrida’s view, closes all possibilities of improvement, as well as all possibilities of 
regression, since both a better and a worse translation is the possibility of a translation. 
A possible better translation could only happen if we assume that the absolutely 
faithful translation between two languages does not really exist, or any translation is 
in certain sense ‘unfaithful’ to or ‘unjust’ for the original. This also echoes Derrida’s 
theory that democracy is always “to come”, since translation itself is inseparable from 
politics. For instance, in the English-speaking world, any English translation of text 
written in other languages could not be absolutely faithful to or do justice to its 
original meaning. This creates a non-democratic relation between English and other 
languages, but this non-democratic relation is also open to improvement, or to 
democracy. This is also the reason why for Derrida, the Genesis story that God 
destroys the ambitious project of building the Babel Tower which connects between 
heaven and earth, transforming the worldly-shared single language into a variety of 
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different tones and disseminating people all over the world is a ‘deconstructive’ and 
also righteous action. As Derrida indicates, 
       In seeking to “make a name for themselves,” to found at the same time a 
universal tongue and a unique genealogy, the Semites want to bring the world 
to reason, and this reason can signify simultaneously a colonial violence 
(Since they would thus universalize their idiom) and a transparency of the 
human community. Inversely, when God imposes and opposes his name, he 
ruptures the rational transparency but interrupts also the colonial violence or 
the linguistic imperialism. He destines them to translation, he subjects them 
to the law of a translation both necessary and impossible; in a stroke with his 
translatable-untranslatable name he delivers a universal reason (it will no 
longer be subject to the rule of a particular nation), but he simultaneously 
limits its very universality: forbidden transparency, impossible univocity 
(111).  
The Derridian reading of this story associates divinity with human plurality and 
justice for ethnic minorities. In particular, the translation as “both necessary and 
impossible” illustrates what Hagglund indicates, namely, the translation between 
different languages is still malleable and is open to possibilities, even better or even 
worse.  
       The Genesis story in “Des Tours de Babel” could also be read as revealing 
human finitude in front of God. When God ‘deconstructs’ the tower He is also forcing 
people to accept their own finitude. We, as humans, could never be perfect, in either 
the moral or the intellectual sense of the term. Therefore, the ambition to build a 
tower reaching until the heavens implies the ambition to have an empire with all 
people speaking the same language and can only be a kind of ‘profanation’. The 
over-ambitious project of the tower, which symbolizes a variety of political projects to 
establish a nation with one language, one religion, one ethnical identity, and a 
self-enclosed territory is merely an “idol”. Human finitude suggests that certain kind 
of “evil” or “violence” is inseparable from human action, just as Martin Hagglund 
indicates repeatedly throughout his book. In this view, the translation which could 
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never fully represents the meaning of the text in its original language is also due to the 
finitude of the translator which could not be overcome by human intelligence. 
Benjamin’s assumption of the ‘pure language,’ on this reading, transcends all 
languages and meanwhile guarantees the objectivity of translation. It would thus seem 
to suggest his unwillingness to acknowledge human finitude, a finitude, again which 
cannot be overcome by any individual translator. Moreover, this finitude could not be 
overcome by assuming the existence or construction of a ‘meta-language’ either.  
       Noticeably, the Derridian God in “Des Tours de Babel” does not represent a 
kind of ‘absolute justice’ or another normative ideal of justice, in contrast to a 
corrupted and unjust secular world, like Walter Benjamin’s divine violence or Leo 
Strauss’s absolute rule of the wise man. The role that God plays in this context is only 
to reveal the fragility of a humanly self-legislated ideal norm of justice. In this sense, 
no ideal norm of justice is immune to the invasion of certain type of ‘evil’ or even 
‘radical evil’. The cosmopolitan project which is symbolized by the tower could also 
transmute into a kind of tyranny. On should recall that both right-wing totalitarianism, 
Nazism, and left-wing totalitarianism, Stalinism, used to proclaim that they were 
establishing their imagined, self-indulgent cosmopolitan projects, which were actually 
based upon the sacrifice of innumerable human lives. This is also the difference 
between the Derridian God invoked in “Des Tours de Babel” and Benjamin’s divine 
violence in his “Critique of Violence”. As I mentioned above, in “Force of Law: The 
Mystical Foundation of Authority”, Derrida links Benjamin’s divine violence to Carl 
Schmitt’s statism, as well as to Nazism which rises almost at the same time when this 
piece is completed. Here Derrida is not confusing the difference between Benjamin’s 
divine violence and Schmitt’s statism (they are different, in fact), nor does he 
insinuate that Benjamin’s theory of the divine violence might be seen as the 
intellectual origin of Nazism. Far from it, Derrida’s purpose is to suggest that any type 
of the ideal norm of justice, no matter how idealistic, like Benjamin’s divine violence, 
is not immune to certain unexpected invasion or contamination of evil, such as 
Nazism, for instance. As Derrida indicates in The Gift of Death, the absolute 
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responsibility for God is always inseparable from the violence against others. As 
Derrida argues, 
       The place where the sacrifice of Abraham or of Isaac is said to have occurred 
is therefore a holy place but also a place that is in dispute, radically and 
rabidly, fought over by all the monotheisms, by all the religions of the unique 
and transcendent God, of the absolute other. These three monotheisms fight 
over it, it is useless to deny it by means of some wide-eyed ecumenism; they 
make war with fire and blood, have always done so and all the more fiercely 
today, each claiming its particular perspective on this place and claiming an 
original historical and political interpretation of Messianism and of the 
sacrifice of Isaac. The reading, interpretation, and tradition of the sacrifice of 
Isaac are themselves sites of bloody, holocaustic sacrifice. Isaac’s sacrifice 
continues every day. Countless machines of death wage a war that has no 
front (2008, 70).  
Thus, the Derridian God does not give an absolute ideal to human. the Derridian God 
in fact makes himself as a ‘differance’, interrupting unexpectedly the norm in the 
human world or the progress of human history, and revealing the finitude of human.  
       The question raised in “Des Tours de Babel” is picked up in Derrida’s 
another piece titled “Hostipitality”. If the ‘pure language’ as a meta-language of all 
languages in “Des Tours de Babel” represents a kind of ‘pseudo-cosmopolitanism’, 
then the same can be said of ‘hostipitality’ in this later essay. When people say that 
one should welcome others or be hospitable to others, this gesture of ‘welcoming’ is 
often preconditioned by another gesture, namely, invitation: only the invited guests 
are welcomed but not the unexpected visitors. The gesture of welcoming or 
hospitality needs to be deconstructed when this limitation of it is revealed. In 
Derrida’s view, this pseudo- or hypocritical hospitality is always preconditioned by 
the “unexpected visiting of strangers”. In other words, the visitation of the invited 
guests is merely one possibility; if hospitality merely includes this type of visitors, it 
becomes potentially exclusive of the possibility of the unexpected visiting. Just like 
the translator always owes a debt to the language from which s/he translates, the 
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practice of welcoming or being hospital always owes a debt to the unexpected 
strangers (380-381). As Derrida indicates, this debt to the strangers is also the debt of 
‘forgiveness’: the host should ask the strangers, the unexpected visitors being 
abandoned by him for their forgiveness30 (389). In this sense, forgiveness, as well as 
hospitality, reveals the connection between subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. In 
Derrida’ view, intersubjectivity is not the continuation of subjectivity. The truth is the 
opposite: intersubjectivity is the underpinning of subjectivity. In other words, one’s 
ego, or one’s ‘cogito ergo sum’ is always underpinned by one’s debt to another ego. 
For illustrating this, Derrida puts great emphasis upon the impossibility of being 
forgiven. The impossibility of being forgiven does not suggest a type of unwillingness 
in an emotional sense, as if the hatred between one and another one is too strong to be 
reconciled31. Rather, it suggests an existential situation which underpins everyone’s 
ego: as long as I realize that my selfhood is constituted by the debt that I owe to others, 
or the forgiveness that I ask from others, I cannot be egoistic and my ‘cogito ergo sum’ 
is deconstructed32 (391). The pseudo-cosmopolitanism is also a kind of ‘collective 







30 “Thus, I have to ask the hote for forgiveness because, unable to ever receive and give him enough, I 
always abandon him too much, but inversely, in asking the other for forgiveness and in receiving him 
the forgiveness of him, I abandon myself to him”. See Derrida, Jacques. “Hospitality.” In Acts of 
Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar, 356-420. London: Routledge, 2002, 389.  
31 “I have to ask, therefore, for forgiveness even before committing a determinable fault. One can call 
this original sin prior to any original sin, prior to the event, real or mystical, real or phantasmatic, of 
any original sin”. Ibid., 388.   
32 “Such that the rapport to forgiveness is no longer a secondary, contingent, moment in a kind of 
chapter of ethics, it is rather constitutive of my being-myself in my rapport with the other. I have to ask 
for forgiveness for being myself, before asking for forgiveness for what I am, for what I do or what I 
have. This ‘forgiveness to be asked for’ belongs to a kind of ‘cogito,’ ‘ego cogito’: as soon as I say I, 
even in solitude, as soon as I say ego cogito, I am in the process of asking for forgiveness or of being 
forgiven, at least if the experience lasts for more than an instant and temporalizes itself”. Ibid., 391. 
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2.2. Justice beyond Cosmopolitanism: Specters of Marx and Spectral Nationality 
       Derrida’s notion of justice in “Force of Law” illustrates what is not 
deconstructable in his view, and Derrida’s argument concerning justice in “Force of 
Law” is further developed in Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning and the New International, a book that is dedicated to the revitalization of 
the revolutionary and emancipatory ideal of Marxism in the post-totalitarian, 
neo-liberal world. The historical transition which is addressed by Derrida in Specters 
of Marx now has already been addressed by numerous works from the Left-Wing: the 
end of Soviet totalitarianism does not necessarily mean the end of the revolutionary 
and emancipatory spirit of Marxism. On the contrary, the social inequality, especially 
global inequality which results from the tremendous increasing of capitalism and the 
expansion of global market in the current post-cold-war era conjures up the spirit of 
Marxism. Global capitalism or Neo-Liberalism instigates its world-wide discontents, 
as well as resistances against it, but these resistances against the current global order 
of Neo-Liberalism does not have to be strictly in the form of Marxism in its 
traditional sense; they are the continuation of the human emancipatory ideal of 
Marxism, but not the party-centered authoritarian rule in old Soviet age. In this sense, 
the phrase “specters of Marx” particularly illuminates what Derrida means 
‘auto-immunity’. The word “specters” suggests that the human emancipatory ideal 
still remains as a ‘spirit’, a ‘ghost’ or a ‘specter’; it still does not have its own body, or 
the true realization of it. Therefore, it cannot separate itself from what it objects to, 
namely, a variety of historical forms of social alienation, domination, enslavement and 
injustice. It has to adopt these ‘evil’ as its temporal body, or the temporal ‘prosthesis’ 
upon which it relies. As Derrida insightfully observes:  
 
       The living ego is auto-immune, which is what they do not want to know. To 
protect its life, to constitute itself as unique living ego, to relate, as the same , 
to itself, it is necessarily led to welcome the other within (so many figures 
of death: differance of the technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, 
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prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins with language, 
before language), it must therefore take the immune defenses apparently 
means for the non-ego, the enemy, the opposite, the adversary and direct 
them at once for itself and against itself. Marx thinks he is a better expert (a 
better “scholar” of ghosts), let us recall that he says in effect to Saint Max: I 
know my way around specters better than you; the ghost is my affair, if you 
want to save life and conjure away the living-dead, you must not go at it 
immediately, abstractly, egologically, fantasmatically, with the word, with the 
language act of a phantasmagoreuein; you must pass through the laborious 
ordeal of the detour, you must traverse and work on the practical structures, 
the solid mediations of real, “empirical” actuality, and so forth. Otherwise, 
you will have conjured away only the phantomality of the body, not the body 
itself of the ghost, namely, the reality of the State, Emperor, Nation, 
Fatherland, and so on. But obviously, for the time of this detour, you must 
accept to take into account the autonomous, relatively autonomous body of 
ghostly reality (177).  
 
The Singaporean case in Pheng Cheah’s Inhuman Conditions that I have 
discussed previously illuminates this. When human right or human dignity in the 
Kantian sense, namely, to be treated as ends rather than to be used as means is 
contaminated by global capitalism, the realization of it as an a-historical permanent 
goal is replaced with contingent resistance against capitalistic exploitation, as how the 
Philippine domestic riot against Singapore case illustrates in Pheng Cheah’s book. In 
Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of 
Liberation, Pheng Cheah makes a philosophical interpretation of the patriotism 
against global capitalism case exemplified by Singapore-Philippine relation. As Cheah 
argues, the Kantian human dignity is in line with the Marxian ideal of the proletarian 
emancipation. However, under the condition of global capitalism, both the Kantian 
and the Marxian ideals have to be temporarily combined into a more contingent action, 
namely, demotic patriotism as political agent against global neo-liberalism. In this 
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sense, as Cheah indicates, the Marxian ideal of the ‘withering state’ is more like an 
‘eschatological goal’, rather than a temporal goal for current moment (209). In the 
current moment, nationalism, state or patriotism still plays a pivotal role in protecting 
domestic labor in non-western under-developed countries like Philippine, for instance, 
resisting the encroachment of global capitalism33. In this sense, Cheah draws a 
distinction between two kinds of nationalism, or the Marxian state apparatus and 
popular patriotism. The latter, as the pursuit of human right, democracy and equality, 
deconstructs the former as the institutional legitimization of the localization of global 
capitalism. In other words, when foreign capital investment encroaches the local 
world, exploiting and enslaving local labor, like what happens between Singaporean 
society and its Philippine FDWs, it is the popular patriotism, according to Cheah, that 
challenges global capitalism, as well as local government which encourages the 
localization of global market. However, this distinction between state apparatus and 
popular patriotism also blurs itself or ‘deconstructs’ itself: on the one hand, popular 
patriotism cannot exist without its institutional backdrop; finally, it is the local 
government that protects people from the dehumanization of capitalism; on the other 
hand, the popular patriotism in pursuit of justice is always in danger of being 
suppressed by the inhumane state apparatus which sometimes also protects the 
interests of capitalists against its people (228). This is also what the title Spectral 
Nationality means: based upon Derrida’s Specters of Marx, it suggests that the 
popular patriotism in pursuit of justice is always instantaneous, contingent and fragile 
in contrast to the state power. It is only a possibility, or in Derrida’s language, justice 
is always “undecidable”. 
																																								 																				 	
33  As Pheng Cheah indicates, “Marx fails to foresee nationalism’s tenacity because he hastily 
determined it as a statist ideology and foreclosed its popular and emancipatory face; this face, which 
revolutionary decolonization exemplifies, is especially important given the uneven globalization of 
capital” Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation. 
New York: Columbia University, 2003, 228. This is not only true for Marx, but also true for Derrida in 
Specters of Marx, upon whose argument Pheng Cheah’s Spectral nationality relies. As Derrida 
indicates in Specters of Marx, “there is no nationality or nationalism that is not religious or 
mythological, let us say “mystical” in the broad sense.” Cheah, Pheng. Specters of Marx: The State of 
the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. London: Routledge, 2006, 113. Derrida’s 
attitude toward nationalism is negative. Here the “mystical” is linked to the “mystical foundation of 
authority” in “Force of Law”.  
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       Besides “Force of Law” and “Specters of Marx”, “Interpretations at War: 
Kant, the Jew, the German” is one of the pieces which illuminate Derrida’s concept of 
‘auto-immunity’, namely, the survival of certain ideals by a kind of ‘self-alienation’. 
“Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German” is Derrida’s interpretation of an 
essay titled “Deutschtum und Judentum”, written by the Neo-Kantian philosopher 
Hermann Cohen before the First World War, which pays a tribute to German military 
victory (146). What interests Derrida about this essay is the apparent conflict between 
the author’s ethnic (Jewish) and intellectual identity (that of a Neo-Kantian 
philosopher), in addition to the content of the essay, which is that an eulogy of 
German victory (181). The reason for this is not complicated: Cohen understands the 
German and Jewish spirits as both historically and philosophically (or culturally and 
spiritually) united; they are inseparable in this sense; thus, the victory of Germany is 
also the victory for German Jews (168); meanwhile, in Cohen’s view, Germany, a land 
with the Kantian philosophy of perpetual peace, is on the side of the righteous and 
therefore has to be defended militarily. In this sense, the victory of Germany is not 
only not in contradistinction to the Kantian doctrine of perpetual peace and a stateless 
world confederation, but is the first step of it: only the victory of Germany can pave 
the way for the ultimate realization of the Kantian world confederation (186-188). In 
this case, the apparent conflict between Judaism, Kantian philosophy and Nationalism, 
German victory illuminates what Derrida means ‘auto-immunity’: both the Jewish 
Messiah and Kantian perpetual peace are not deconstructable, just like justice in 
“Force of Law”; but either Jewish Messiah or the perpetual peace has to adopt 
German nationalism, its state apparatus as well as its military strength as its temporal 
incarnation, or the ‘specter’ of it has to adopt German nationalism as its corporeal 
body, even this body is merely a ‘prosthesis’ for it. As long as the ‘specter’ of Jewish 
Messiah and perpetual peace still does not have its own ‘body’, or the true realization 
of it, it is inseparable from German nationalism as the ‘prosthesis’ of it. As Derrida 
indicates, Cohen makes the point that “the power of the state is necessary in order to 
make socialism effective, to make it into something other than a ‘blunt weapon and a 
half-truth.’” (187). Though a Kantian scholar, different from Kant, Cohen believes in 
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the “necessity of permanent armies” (187). This is based upon the consideration that 
only military strength can stop ‘militarism’, or the abuse of it, as Cohen argues, 
 
       “Expecting a universal lasting peace from what is called the balance of 
European powers is purely a chimera, similar to that house in Swift, built by 
an architect in a manner so conforming to the rules of equilibrium, that a 
sparrow having alighted upon it, it crumbled instantly”. Militarism is a 
depravation of the military. It arises when people exalt an army that, rather 
than serve a State worthy of this name, serves economic powers and the 
interests of capitalist expansionism. An antinomy may exist between the 
State and the military when the army puts itself in the service of private 
economic forces or a fraction of civilian society. But once it has become 
effective, the ideal State--- that is, ethical and confederative in its 
orientation, hence German in spirit---- has no reason to give up its 
permanent army. Cohen thus opposes “our conception of military service” 
to that of the English enemy, whose social policy gave an impetus to the 
war (188).  
 
This quasi-Schmittian stance also distances Cohen’s position from the patriots who 
advocates nationalism enthusiastically and uncritically. Strictly speaking, Cohen does 
not merely advocate patriotism. For him, patriotism only paves the way for the 
coming of a hope in future.  
       In Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida, 
Hent de Vries interrogates the Derridian God from a genealogical perspective. Hent’s 
point in the first chapter of this book, which is a chapter dedicated to Kant’s political 
philosophy, echoes Derrida’s reading of Cohen in ‘Interpretations at War”. The 
Kantian moral philosophy is a paradox of, or a dialect of moral perfection and human 
finitude which prevents people from achieving moral perfection, or reserves chances 
for the ineradicable evil. On the one hand, the Kantian deontology represents a kind of 
moral perfection which all human beings have to achieve. But on the other hand, the 
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human finitude always prevents people from reaching this morally-perfect status, and 
therefore to achieve moral perfection, in a Kantian view, could only be a progress. For 
the progress toward moral perfection, state censorship is required for preventing both 
religious sectarianism or fanaticism and scientific research from entering the public 
realm (99). For Kant, to achieve moral perfection requires the assistance of religion, 
or Christianity in particular, but Christianity as only rational theology, not superstition, 
fanaticism or authority beyond secular life. Meanwhile, academic life should be 
separated from public realm and kept strictly inside universities, the realm in which 
the investigation of the ‘phenomenal world’ is conducted (45). However, even 
censorship cannot completely prevent the unexpected intrusion of the ‘radical evil’, 
which could possibly ruin the self-legislated, self-autonomous human world 
(102-103). In this sense, in his moral philosophy, Kant reserves space for the “divine 
intervention” which could interrupt the progress of human history unexpectedly, 
bringing a morally perfect world to us34  (105-107). Hent does not talk about 
“Interpretations at War” in this chapter regarding Kant, but in “Interpretations at War”, 
Cohen’s point concerning German victory shares a similar logic with this: that army is 
indispensable for the realization of perpetual peace is just like that state censorship is 
indispensable for the realization of moral perfection; both world-peace and moral 
perfection cannot be achieved immediately; moreover, just like state censorship, 
military strength or nationalism does not prevent either a more radical ‘alterity’ of a 
																																								 																				 	
34 As Hent de Vries says, “postulating the possibility of the worst at the very root of the possibility of 
the best does not prevent Kant from entertaining yet another possibility, that of a sudden revolution, a 
‘change of heart.’ This change does not announce itself as the result of a moral progress in time, but is 
its precondition, commencement, or promise. Rather, its revolution—in an ambiguity of meaning 
reminiscent of the comparison, in the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, of the Revolution 
der Denkungsart to Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus, as well as to the French Revolution—has a 
specific, circular, or elliptical temporality of its own. It is at once timeless--- plus d’un temps, no more 
time and more than one time or more of one time--- and the heartbeat or the inner clock of reason’s 
unseen yet, Kant, believes, providential movement throughout the universal history of humankind”. 
See De Vries, Hent. Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1999, 105; “At the point Kant introduces a double solution: 
he postulates an infinite time after the time given us in this life, which allows an in principle infinite 
range of possibilities---- apparently at once reasonable and incomprehensible--- of divine assistance: 
“Only with respect to that which God alone can do, for which to do anything ourselves would exceed 
out capacity and hence also our duty, there we can have a genuine, i.e., a holy, mystery of religion. And 
it might perhaps be useful only to know and to understand that there is such a mystery rather than to 
have insight into it”. Ibid., 107.  
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peaceful world, or the ‘radical evil’ of militarism or nationalism exclusive of ethnical 
minorities. Unfortunately, 20th century history after Cohen’s death (which is during 
the First World War) sees the possibility of ‘radical evil’, rather than the possibility of 
‘everlasting peace’: the rise of Nazism disproves Cohen’s radical hope that Jews could 
share the land with Germans and a world confederation is realizable based upon this35 
(140).  
       What Derrida questions in “Interpretations at War”, namely, the possibility 
that nationalism/patriotism and cosmopolitanism could be reconciled, or the 
possibility that nationalism/patriotism could advance cosmopolitanism, has already 
been a popular topic today. As I noted earlier, Pheng Cheah, the Derrida-inspired 
Post-Colonial Scholar whose project combines Derrida’s problematics in both 
Specters of Marx and “Force of Law”, uses Derrida creatively to defend his thesis that 
patriotism plays a pivotal role in resisting global capitalism, protecting the human 
right of local labor in South-Eastern Asia and advancing cosmopolitanism into a level 
beyond Neo-Liberalism. Pheng Cheah does not address Derrida’s “Interpretations at 
War” in his own work, but the overlapping between them is obvious. Moreover, 
Martha Nussbaum, a liberalist political philosopher whose work is dedicated to the 
problem of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, makes similar point in one of her recent 
books titled Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. For Nussbaum, the 
significance of patriotism is that patriotism, as a kind of collective political emotion, 
increases people’s compassion for the disadvantaged minorities. In this view, 
patriotism is not only not the opposite of pluralism as a fundamental principle of 
liberalism, but advances it. In Nussbaum’s view, people cannot love others for no 
reason, and one’s compassion for others is often limited to those whose lives are 
closely tied to one’s own. Thus, the best way to make people feel responsible for 
those disadvantaged whose lives are not directly associated with one’s own life is to 
																																								 																				 	
35 The relation between the time of Cohen’s death and the time of the publication of “Deutschtum und 
Judentum” illuminates Derrida’s thought on temporality and possibility. Cohen died at the end of the 
war, in 1918, three years after the publication of this essay. See Derrida, Jacques. “Interpretations at 
War: Kant, the Jew, the German.” In Derrida, Jacques. Acts of Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar, 135-188. 
London: Routledge, 2002.  
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make people believe that their lives are indeed inseparable from the lives of those 
disadvantaged, and patriotism, according to Nussbaum, is what can make this happen. 
Nussbaum assumes that patriotism is to love everyone in a country, rather than to love 
one’s nation as a political symbol (2015, 211). The apparent difference between 
Nussbaum and Derrida’s accounts of patriotism is that Nussbaum, as least in this book, 
does not consider patriotism as an ideology of exclusivism, but Derrida is more 
cautious of this aspect of it. Just like Pheng Cheah indicates, even popular patriotism 
which aims at saving the nation from foreign capital is not immune to the oppressive 
side of state apparatus, and the state is always possible to be a ‘prison’, rather than a 
‘haven’.  
       Derrida particularly addresses this at the end of “Interpretations at War”, in 
relation to the French social theorist Renan, whose viewpoint seems overlapping 
Cohen’s but is a different sort. As Derrida indicates, the difference between Cohen 
and Renan is the difference between ‘memory’ and ‘forgetting’. For Cohen, to ask 
German Jews to love Germany is also a way to keep the memory of their own history, 
since their history is deeply entangled with German history: “for Cohen, to become 
aware of a sort of spiritual Jewish-German nation is to practice anamnesis of a rather 
peculiar kind” (184). But for Renan, it is forgetting, rather than memory, and in 
particular, the deliberatively manipulated forgetting of certain historical events 
concerning the founding of a nation that makes a nation a solidarity. Derrida’s point 
on Renan is significant for my argument of this thesis and need to be quoted here 
almost completely. As Derrida says: 
       Now, Renan’s thesis, simultaneously paradoxical and sensible, is that 
forgetting makes the unity of a nation, not memory. More interestingly, 
Renan analyzes this forgetting as a sort of repression: it is active, selective, 
meaningful, in one word interpretive. Forgetting is not, in the case of a nation, 
a simple psychological effacement, a wearing out or a meaningless obstacle 
making access to the past more difficult, as when an archive has been 
accidentally destroyed. No, if there is a forgetting, this is because there is no 
bearing something which was at the origin of the nation, surely an act of 
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violence, a traumatic event, some sort of a curse one does not admit. 
[Quoting Derrida quoting Renan] Forgetting, and I would say even historical 
error, are an essential factor in the formation of a nation, and thus the 
progress of historical study is often a danger for nationality. Historical 
investigation, in effect, brings back to light the violent deeds which took 
place at the origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences 
have been beneficial. Unity is always achieved brutally: the union of 
Northern and Southern France was the result of extermination and of terror 
continued for nearly a century (184). A series of examples (French, Slavic, 
Czech, and German) allows Renan to conclude: ‘Now, the essence of a nation 
is that all individuals should have many things in common and that all should 
have forgotten quite a few things. No French citizen knows whether he is a 
Burgundian, an Alainian, a Tifalian, a Visigoth; every French citizen must 
have forgotten Saint Bartholomew, the 13th century massacres in the South 
(185).  
Renan’s theory of forgetting and national solidarity is almost Walter Benjamin’s 
‘law-preserving violence’ in his “Critique of Violence” but from a different angle. It is 
more Foucauldian since it is in regard to the relation between “knowledge” and 
“power”: As Renan believes, “A nation is a spiritual principle” (184). It first exists in 
everyone’s mind and then as a political entity. But to manipulate people’s thought 
requires a series of “political techniques”: education is undoubtedly the most 
important for the purpose of it; meanwhile, publication and mass media have to be 
managed directly by the government, so that any information regarding national 
belonging should not deviate from the common belief which the government 
inculcates to its people; also, historical research concerning the founding of the nation, 
national belonging and identity has to be, even not forbidden completely, kept strictly 
inside universities, so that the research will not disturb people’s faith in their nation; 
archives have to be also managed directly by the government, or even destroyed or at 
least corrected, so that the ‘origin of truth’ gets totally controlled by the government.  
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       In “Interpretations at War”, the relation between Cohen and Renan on 
nationalism parallels the relation between justice and the unjust law in “Force of 
Law”, the relation between ‘the messianic or ‘messianicity without messianism’ and 
“messianism” in “Faith and Knowledge”, and the relation between the good and bad 
‘specters’ in Specters of Marx. The former deconstructs the latter, but is also in danger 
of being suppressed by the latter. Derrida does not believe in a clear distinction 
between these two. In other words, what matters for Derrida is not how to “save the 
truth” of history from the contaminated and manipulated archive. There is no clear 
distinction between the authentic and inauthentic archives. What matters for Derrida 
is that the presence, a presence with the truth of the past being manipulated, will be 
deconstructed or interrupted by the unexpected coming of the future, a future of 
Jewish Messiah or a world of peace. This future ‘to-come’ is not merely another 
futural moment of presence. In other words, the relation between future and presence 
here does not resemble the future and presence in Heidegger’s Being and Time, in 
which every present moment is described as the “past of the future”. The Derridian 
future is a kind of ‘radical alterity’ which is irreducible to the present. What remain 
‘non-deconstructable’ is deeply associated with Derrida’s notion of temporality, or the 
future as a radical alterity. This is also what the specters of Marx and ‘messianicity 
without messianism’ mean. As Pheng Cheah indicates, “Derrida suggests that time is 
given by what is entirely other to being. The other is not temporal, not in the sense 
that it is an absolute being that transcends time, but rather because it is not a form of 
presence and exceeds the order of being” (2016, 165); “it refers to an otherness that 
cannot be reduced to being and presence” (166). Or, As Hent de Vries contends in 
Philosophy and the Turn to Religion: 
 
Specters of Marx will reiterate that the messianisms that retain this structure 
establish a continuity between their inaccessible--- intelligible or 
utopian—avenir and the “temporal form of a future present, of a future 
modality of a living present.” This form of most, perhaps all, messianisms 
should not be confused with the destructuring structure of messianicity as it is 
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introduced in this more recent work. Here, we are dealing with an a venir, with 
a temporality out of joint, marked, quite literally, by the splitting of avenir 
(future) into a venir (to-come). For in both cases (“Force of Law” and 
“Specters of Marx”) the emphasis is on the necessary distinction between an 
end that announces itself (and eventually takes place) within a horizon of 
possible expectation, on the one hand, and a structure of infinity that stands 
for and enables an appeal here and now--- here and now being without 

























Normative Objectivism and Normative Fictionalism: Deconstruction and Justice 
 
       Ending this thesis, my purpose is to highlight where Derrida’s thought sheds 
a light upon political thought. In this sense, the insightfulness of Derrida’s thought is 
that he compels us to reflect upon all the ‘human emancipatory ideals’ both currently 
and historically. These ‘human emancipatory ideals’, which are either political or 
theological or both political and theological, are either too ‘idealistic’, in a sense that 
they are believed to be the permanent solutions to all ‘evil’, but prove to be 
untrustworthy in contrast to a variety of ‘evil’ or ‘radical evil’ which happen both 
currently and historically, or they are with essential limitation, and the limitation of 
them has to be revealed, like Francis Fukuyama’s ‘liberal democracy as the end of 
history’, which is criticized in Specters of Marx. In this sense, not only George Sorel’s 
proletarian violence, Walter Benjamin’s divine violence and Rousseau’s general will 
are political ideals which do not really allow the ‘differance’, or ‘auto-immunity’ 
against its ideal, even thinkers whose theory is mostly featured by ‘contingency’ and 
‘spontaneity’ is not immune to Derrida’s critique, like Hannah Arendt, for instance. 
Derrida does not write anything about Hannah Arendt, but Arendt’s political 
philosophy is potentially underpinned by the kind of ‘dogmatism’ which could be 
questioned from a Derridian perspective. Arendt’s dogmatism is the strict distinction 
that she draws between the two spheres of human life, the public and the private, as 
well as the distinctions between the three fundamental types of human behaviors, 
namely, labor, work and action. For Arendt, action, as the ultimate goal of human life, 
and public sphere or political life belong to each other. Human action, which is 
characterized by the anonymity of its agents, the irreversibility of its process and the 
unpredictability of its result, is essentially different from the other two ‘inferior’ 
categories, work and labor, which only belong to the private sphere (p.7-9). In 
Arendt’s view, the best type of society is a society where the public and the private 
spheres are separated, or the boundaries between action, work and labor are not 
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transgressed. Violence, enslavement and dehumanization happen when the boundaries 
between the public and the private, or between labor, work and action are blurred. 
When the boundaries are transgressed, human action is deprived of its contingency, 
spontaneity, unpredictability and irreversibility, substituted by work and labor and 
therefore becomes collectively manageable; meanwhile, people under such condition, 
are no longer respected as ends but are used as means to achieve collectively 
manageable and predictable goals. In Arendt’s political philosophy, this 
boundary-transgression is also the transition between ancient and modern: the best 
type of society only belongs to ancient Greek polity, whereas modern world, 
constituted by capitalism and industrialization, is what replaces action with work and 
labor, or with collective social administration (1998, 41). In this sense, Arendt’s 
objection to the boundary-transgression is where Derrida could possibly object to 
Arendt: in a Derridian view, the boundary-transgression is what ‘differance’ means, 
namely, there is no distinction between divinity and profanation, or between 
originality and contamination.  
       Martin Hagglund is correct that Derrida’s questioning of the 
political/religious/metaphysical ideals is where he is insightful. On his view, if we 
read “Force of Law” and “Faith and Knowledge” only as evidences to suggest 
Derrida’s compassion for the disadvantaged minorities, as John D. Caputo does in The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, or Simon Critchley 
does in The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, then the significance of 
Derrida’s thought, especially in its more nuanced parts will inevitably be overlooked36. 
																																								 																				 	
36  In The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Caputo argues that Derrida’s purpose is to 
‘deconstruct’ the ‘messianisms’ which is exclusive of ethnical minorities, or to deconstruct the ‘unjust’. 
The deconstruction of the unjust makes room for the ‘just’, the inclusivism, the tolerance of the 
minorities. Similar point could be seen in Michael Naas’s Derrida from Now No, in which the author 
makes similar argument concerning the ethical dimension of Derrida’s deconstruction. This is certainly 
not wrong but is insufficient. It is only part of Derrida’s thought. As I have indicated, Derrida not only 
deconstructs the ‘messianisms’, ‘hospitality’, or the Abraham religion of sacrificing the others for one’s 
faith in God, he also deconstructs all the ‘human emancipatory ideals’, the just, the democratic, the 
idealistic. As I have indicated, Derrida believes that no political/religious ideal could remain all the 
same as uncontaminated, as the idealistic without profanation. On the contrary, they have to suffer from 
the destruction of them, or the ‘deconstruction’ of them, a kind of ‘self-alienation’, differance, or 
auto-immunity. The important thing here is that, as I quote from Specters of Marx previously in the 
thesis, auto-immunity, the Derridian lexicon, means that everything has to survive via a kind of 
self-mutilation or self-alienation. This is not only true for the ‘messianisms’, or ‘hospitality’, as 
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This questioning of the human emancipatory ideal could also be illuminated by 
Samuel Moyn’s recent book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. The 
problematics in The Last Utopia largely overlaps Derrida’s Specters of Marx, as well 
as Pheng Cheah’s ‘Specters-of-Marx’ inspired work Spectral Nationality and Inhuman 
Conditions. Moyn deals with the same historical transition in the second half of the 
20th century, namely from totalitarian socialism to global neo-liberalism. The failure 
of the latest human emancipatory ideal, Soviet socialism, was quickly replaced with 
the appeal to human rights as a new invention by the geo-politically ‘Western world’, 
which saw the failure of Soviet socialism as its own victory. As Moyn indicates, the 
paradox of human rights is that as a device of political emancipation, their advantage 
is also their disadvantage: they are believed to be the most pure and clean ideal of 
justice, devoid of all sorts of political violence associated with revolution. But this is 
also their disadvantage: there is nothing that they can do to help people fighting 
against the unjust, especially in a new era of neo-liberalism. In this sense, Moyn’s 
critique of human right resembles Derrida’s critique of Francis Fukuyama in Specters 
of Marx, although it is developed from a different angle: Moyn’s critique of 
neo-liberalism specifically focuses upon human right as a by-product of the rise of 
neo-liberalism in the post-Soviet era, pointing out its impotence to resist the historical 
circumstance which legitimizes it, namely, global capitalism or neo-liberalism.   
       In a philosophical view, the question that Derrida poses, or the question that 
deconstruction deals with is a question concerning normativity, or the relation 
between “value” and “norm”. In fact, what Derrida criticizes in “Force of Law”, 
namely, law is the synonym of justice, or the equivalence to justice, could be defined 
as Normative Objectivism, using the lexicon from analytic philosophy. In this view, 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 													 	
Michael Nass indicates in his book, but is also true for the revolutionary/emancipatory ideal of 
Marxism or the Jewish Messiah, just as Derrida indicates in “Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jews, the 
German” and Specters of Marx. This could also be illuminated by a paragraph at the end of Derrida’s 
essay “A Silkworm of One’s Own”: “namely that the silkworm buried itself, came back to itself in its 
odyssey, in a sort of absolute knowledge, as if it had to wrap itself in its own shroud, the white shroud 
of its own skin, in order to remain with itself, the being it has been with a view to re-engendering itself 
in the spinning of its filiation.” See Derrida, Jacques. “A silkworm of One’s Own.” In Acts of Religion, 
edited by Gil Anidjar. London: Routledge, 2006, 354. Before becoming the butterfly, the butterfly has 
to be temporarily the silkworm.  
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the definition of law and justice are coterminous with each other. In contrast to 
Normative Objectivism, Derrida’s own view could be defined as Normative 
Fictionalism: namely, law does not represent justice, or justice is not the essence of 
law; in one word, law could be unjust. But this does not indicate that people could live 
without law. Our life-world is essentially constituted by the normative structure of law, 
or the normative structure of other types of ‘laws’, or discourses, if we understand the 
Derridian law in a typically Post-Structuralistic sense. This is also where Derrida’s 
thought overlaps other French Post-Structuralists, like Michael Foucault, Jacques 
Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler and Slavoj 
Zizek. All of them, including Derrida, have the same type of viewpoint of normative 
fictionalism. They all have the similar point that human subjectivity or human action 
is discursively constructed or constituted by certain kind of norm or code.  
In The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza, Alexandre Lefebvre 
questions the normativity of law by interrogating the tension between the 
‘generality/normativity’ of law and the ‘particularity’ of each case for which the law is 
applicable. As Lefebvre indicates, the significance of Deleuze for legal thought is that 
it reveals the limitation of normative objectivism in the realm of jurisdiction, which 
could be illustrated by Kantian moralism37. This critique of the normativity of law 
could be furthered by my argument in this thesis via the critical lens of Derrida. In a 
Derridian view, the problem is not only the conflict between the universality of law 
and the particularity of the case, but also the moral nature of law. The difference 
																																								 																				 	
37	 As Alexandre Lefebvre writes, “Kantian moral law, another product of the ‘eighteenth-century,’ 
functions analogously to scientific law—it too converts singular actions and affects into particulars: 
“the application of the moral law can be conceived only by restoring . . . the model of the law of nature” 
(DR, 4). Moral law is enacted through a ‘test’ of repetition, a test of the types  of habits and behaviors 
that can in principle be repeated without contradiction – ‘What is Kant’s highest test’ if not a criterion 
which should decide what can in principle be reproduced—in other words, what can be repeated 
without contradiction in the form of moral law? The man of duty invented a ‘test’ of repetition; he 
decided what in principle could be repeated. He thought he had thereby defeated both the demonic and 
the wearisome” (DR,4). At the expense of singular actions, practices and dispositions, moral law 
grounds us in the arrangement between the general and particular: actions are converted—tested—into 
repeatable particularities of a general moral law. Affective, practical becoming are substituted for a 
moral law that in advance gives a principle by which to recognize actions that conform to it. Such an 
operation recovers the concept of law with it s calculable and sterile temporality on the plane of 
practical reason.” Lefebvre, Alexandre. The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza. Diss. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University, 2007,92.  
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between normative fictionalism and the Kantian normativity is that the 
Post-Structuralistic normativity, or normative fictionalism, does not have the moral 
essence as the Kantian has. This could also be seen in Derrida’s recently-published 
two-volume lecture series titled The Death Penalty. Against abolitionist, Kant makes 
the claim that death penalty represents human dignity and therefore cannot be 
abolished. In other words, people who commit crimes deserve death penalty, and this 
is what human dignity, or the universal law requires them to do38 (2014, 127). Kant 
bestows death penalty with a strong sense of morality, but Derrida does not 
acknowledge it. For Derrida, death penalty, as part of law, a kind of social norm, does 
not have the kind of moral essence that Kant expects from it. Death penalty could 
certainly be unjust since law could be unjust39. In a Derridian view, this is also true for 
democracy. as Derrida indicates in Rogues, the democratic procedure does not 
necessarily guarantee democracy or justice. The result of democratic decision could 
be the birth of tyranny, like the rise of Nazism in Germany, for instance. From the 
perspective of normative objectivism, value is inseparable from its normative 
construction, like justice is inseparable from law or liberal democracy. Derrida not 
only acknowledges normative fictionalism, or the hiatus between justice and law, but 
also expects to bring the “value” or justice back by questioning, interrogating, 
deconstructing or criticizing the normative construction of value, or justice. In Rogues, 
Derrida holds quasi-Schmittian belief, arguing that a radical intervention or 
interruption of democratic voting or decision could save democracy from tyranny 
																																								 																				 	
38	 “In other words, and this is one of the great paradoxically interesting things about this Kantian 
position, which is as rigorous as it s absurd--- when the history of morality and of civil society will 
have progressed to the point where there is no more discord between the subjective motives and the 
objective rules, then the categorical imperative that presides over the death penalty will be fully 
coherent, with neither cruelty nor indulgence, but of course, there will be no more need to sentence to 
death. But while waiting for that to happen, in order to think the law, the ideal and rational purity of the 
law, one must maintain the principle of the categorical imperative, that is, the talionic law and inscribe 
the death penalty in the law, even if the ideal is to be never obliged to pronounce it in a verdict.” 
Derrida, Jacques. The Death Penalty (Volume 1). Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2014, 127.  
39	 “In other words, if all men are condemned to die, then the poor are more condemned to die. But 
above all, to move toward the more specific problem of criminal law, and even of the death penalty, of 
the condemnation to death, it is well known that everywhere, and in particular in the United States, a 
rich man has a better chance than a poor man of securing his defense in conditions where he can avoid 
the death penalty, avoid being, precisely, condemned to death; we also know that the majority of those 
condemned to death are blacks and poor blacks.” Derrida, Jacques. The Death Penalty (Volume 2). 
Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2017, 143.  
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(2005, 33). But the difference between Derrida and Schmitt is that this radical 
interruption of democracy is not done by the sovereign power, but by people 
themselves. In the case of cosmopolitanism and neo-liberalism, as in Specters of Marx 
or “Faith and Knowledge”, Derrida contends that a truly cosmopolitan world could 
unexpectedly interrupt the pseudo-cosmopolitanism, or neo-liberalism, bringing 
cosmopolitanism back by interrupting neo-liberalism as its normative structure. Or, 
there will be another type of the human emancipatory ideal which preconditions and 
interrupts all ‘utopias’, or even ‘the last utopia’ in the future. It will be the ‘utopia 
after the last utopia’, or, in Derrida’s own language, ‘messianicity without 
messianism’: 
       First name: the messianic, or messianicity without messianism. This would 
be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of 
justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic 
prefiguration. The coming of the other can only emerge as a singular event 
when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other and death--- and radical 
evil--- can come as a surprise at any moment. Possibilities that both open and 
can always interrupt history, or at least the ordinary course of history. But 
this ordinary course is that of which philosophers, historians and often also 
the classical theoreticians of the revolution speak. Interrupting or tearing 
history itself apart, doing it by deciding, in a decision that can consist in 
letting the other come and that can take the apparently passive form of the 
other’s decision: even there where it appears in itself, in me, the decision is 
moreover always that of the other, which does not exonerate me of 
responsibility. The messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise and, even if it 
always takes the phenomenal form of peace or of justice, it ought, exposing 
itself so abstractly, be prepared for the best as for the worst, the one never 
coming without opening the possibility of the other. At issue there is a 
“general structure of experience.” This messianic dimension does not depend 
upon any messianism, it follows no determinate revelation, it belongs 
properly to no Abrahamic religion (56).  
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The Derrida jargon “messianicity without messianism” has three connotations. First, it 
refers to anti-determinism or the possibility beyond determinism. Messianicity 
without messianism suggests that future is always indeterminate or undecidable. This 
is also where Derrida’s thought overlaps all critiques against determinism. Second, it 
has a special meaning of temporality. Messianicity without messianism does not mean 
merely another type of ‘possiblism’, or a better future beyond present moment. It is a 
kind of contingence which could possibly interrupts and intervenes into any present 
moment. It preconditions or re-structures the normal progress of time. Last but not the 
least, messianicity without messianism refers to the inconsistency between value and 
its normative form. If the normative form of messianism is the Christian messianism, 
the deconstruction of the normativity of messianism opens the dialogue between the 
‘messianic values’ and its regular form, just like between justice and law. In this sense, 
messianicity is also the messianism without form, or form-less messianism, but 
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